CUSLAR Newsletter Winter 2002

Shock to the System: a growing indigenous and people’s movement in Bolivia

First published by In These Times, September 16, 2002 issue; www.inthesetimes.com

by Linda Farthing and Ben Kohl

On June 30 marked indigenous leader won significant support in presidential elections for the first time, rattling the Bolivian establishment and the United States. It shouldn’t be so much of a surprise: the second place finish for Evo Morales, a leader of the powerful coca growers union, is a rejection of both World Bank-led economic policies and the U.S.-financed War on Drugs that has been brewing for some time.

With almost 21 percent of the vote, Morales received just 1.5 percent fewer votes than mining entrepreneur and former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (or 'Goni'). Sanchez de Lozada formed a weak coalition to win the congressional runoff, capturing the presidency on August 6th.

A number of factors contributed to Morales¹ surprising showing at the polls. Since 1998, under intense U.S. pressure, more than 80 percent of the coca that had been the country¹s most valuable agricultural product has been eradicated. Bolivia's success has led the United States to consider the country its most successful drug control program in the Andes. But a severe economic downturn has resulted, and promised U.S. aid to offset the effects of eradication has been slow in coming.

Consequently, active anti-U.S. sentiment now joins frustration with previous democratically elected governments, which have contributed to establishing Bolivia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Income levels have stagnated for the past 20 years, and the economic collapse of Argentina has hit the country particularly hard - since January, remittances from an estimated 1.5 million Bolivians resident there have dropped sharply.

The 2001 victory against privatization of the city of Cochabamba¹s municipal water supply put Bolivia on the anti-globalization map. The “water wars,” an uprising of a broad coalition of citizen groups, led to a state of siege and the subsequent expulsion of an international consortium, led by the U.S. firm Bechtel, now suing the Bolivian government for $25 million for breach of contract. The popular victory fueled nationalist sentiment against neoliberal economic policies and contributed to a wave of protests by tropical coca growers and indigenous peasants, who repeatedly blocked national highways in 2000 and 2001.

This nationalist, anti-neoliberal sentiment undermined support for Sanchez de Lozada, who as Minister of Planning was a principal architect of the 1985 application of structural adjustment policies, which privatized state enterprises, led to the firing of tens of thousands of public workers, and severely reduced social spending. The successful implementation of structural adjustment in Bolivia made the country a model for development policies later applied around the world.

A decade later, during his first administration, Sanchez de Lozada pushed through the partial sale of the country’s largest state-owned firms to multinational capital. Before privatization, income from oil and gas production provided almost 50 percent of government revenue, and its loss has contributed to the ongoing financial crisis.

But perhaps U.S. ambassador Manuel Rocha gave Morales the biggest push at the polls. In a highly publicized announcement just days before the election, Rocha promised to withdraw all U.S. aid if Morales became president. Popular anger at this patent meddling in the country’s democratic process boosted Morales’ support significantly: Bolivian analysts estimate that the 'Rocha effect' contributed as much as five percent to Morales final tally. Since the election, the press has dryly referred to Rocha as Morales' campaign manager.

The growing role of indigenous people in local government also contributed to Morales¹s success. In 1995, Sanchez de Lozada's government introduced a decentralization scheme that increased local participation in planning, while successfully fragmenting opposition to neoliberal policies and refocusing attention on the local level. As a result, more of the rural population, which make up almost half of the country, voted for indigenous leaders rather than the usual mestizo ('mixed') urban populists who have successfully manipulated indigenous voters for decades.

This display of electoral power - almost a third of the 157 members of the Congress and Senate are now indigenous - has significant implications for social movements throughout South America. Over the past 20 years, political decentralization programs from Mexico to Chile have to varying degrees allowed for increased grassroots participation in local government. At the same time, economic crises have created unrest and resentment at policies favoring international capital and reduced social spending.

The growing frustration with the status quo has been expressed through the election of progressives in Chile and Peru as well as Morales' success in Bolivia. Both Brazil, where the Workers' Party currently leads at the polls, +and Ecuador, where an indigenous candidate is showing growing support, have presidential elections scheduled for October.

The challenge for these new political forces will be to develop innovative policies - whether in government or in opposition - capable of addressing the needs of the poor majority in an increasingly global economic setting.