

Logos : λόγος

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Editor's Introduction

Logos' editorial staff is proud to present volume II – issue 2, the third issue since the founding of the journal just over a year ago. During this time, the journal has continued to grow and has increased the size of its staff, doubled its financial resources, and expanded its readership and distribution among the countries' top universities. Most importantly, the submissions pool has become increasingly competitive, drawing submissions from the United States, Canada, and India. We welcome this trend as we work towards our goal of establishing *Logos* as the premier peer-reviewed undergraduate journal of philosophy.

In many ways, the present issue represents a transition period for the journal. The success of the first two issues has vindicated our efforts to provide a firm basis from which to further develop the journal and explore new outlets for philosophical exchange. We have also reached a stage at which we must make a definitive decision concerning the general content, form, and style of the journal. While the stage is set for the continued success of the journal, the present issue marks the departure of the founding staff, whose dedication and commitment is responsible for the continued publication of *Logos*. The primary challenge for the new editorial leadership is to keep improving the quality of the journal while finding creative ways to further our mission of aiding in the formation of an intellectual 'common ground' amongst the undergraduate community.

Towards this end and in virtue of our openness to try new things, the present issue contains a new section dedicated to a review of a contemporary philosophical work. The Blackwell's Companion to Heidegger, here reviewed by Enoch Lambert, is a comprehensive collection of 31 essays that explore and present critiques aimed at a wide range of Heideggerian themes. The collection is an important philosophical contribution insofar as the essays provide original insights that are bound to provoke thought on of the twentieth century's most important thinkers. We hope to make book reviews an integral component of future issues.

As in the past, submissions were evaluated on the basis of quality of research, depth of philosophical inquiry, ingenuity, and clarity. We also took into consideration

the accessibility of submissions to a non-specialized audience, and made our final selections so as to ensure that a distinct philosophical problem is addressed in each essay. The submissions pool from which the feature essays were selected was by far the most competitive to date and so our finalists comprise some of the top undergraduate work to be found.

Mathew Spooner of Bowdoin College presents an analysis of John Locke's theory of material and personal identity and contrasts it with 17th century Anglican Church doctrine. In an effort to expose his theory as being generally incompatible with Christian belief in the resurrection of the body, Spooner argues that despite Locke's insistence to the contrary, his metaphysical philosophy stands opposed to Christian teachings.

Jed Lewison of Cornell University puts forth a modified explanation of the source of the absurdity of Moorean sentences such as "It is raining, but I don't believe it". The oddity of such sentences arises from the apparent contradiction in contrasting present belief states with the present states of the world. In particular, Lewinson argues that the absurdity is located in believing the Moorean sentences, and the absurdity of the assertion follows from the absurdity of the belief.

Shen-yi Liao of Rutgers University – the Spring 2005 *Logos* essay contest winner – writes on new approaches to traditional problems of material constitution that find their contemporary formulation in the work of Leonard and Goodman. He argues that a theory that combines strong composition as identity, unrestricted composition and four-dimensionalism provides a better solution to the problems of material constitution than Kit Fine's notion of rigid and variable embodiments.

To conclude, we must thank our various contributors for their continued support, without which the present issue would not have been possible: the *Logos* editorial staff, the Cornell University Student Assembly Finance Commission, and most importantly the faculty and staff at the Sage School of Philosophy.

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Locke's Theory of
Personal Identity
and Belief in Resurrection

Matthew Spooner, Bowdoin College

Despite the oft-cited dogmatism of the Puritans who dominated much of 17th century England's intellectual landscape, one of the Puritan's principle concerns was the harmonization of the conflicting claims made by reason and faith.¹ As a man who both grew up in a strict Puritan household and was actively involved with many of the principle actors in England's scientific revolution, John Locke harbored a similar desire to reconcile Christian faith with his radically empirical epistemology.² To his contemporary critics, however, Locke's philosophy often appeared to run afoul with traditionally accepted church doctrine, and the publication of his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* drew a great deal of negative attention from members of the established Church. Perhaps the most famous of these critics is Edward Stillingfleet, the Bishop of Worcester, who engaged Locke in an extended and sometimes heated debate about a wide range of religious and philosophical topics. The "Stillingfleet Correspondence" is an endlessly fascinating collection in part because, in revealing a Locke forced to elaborate upon and defend his philosophical assumptions, the letters help to elucidate the implications his philosophy has on issues not fully expounded upon in his major works. A fine example is his discussion of personal identity and its relation to the resurrection. In Locke's rebuttal to Stillingfleet's accusation that his writings "alter the foundation of this article of faith," we are able to see with some clarity that, despite his best intentions, Locke failed in developing a philosophy that was compatible with certain key religious doctrines.

In proposing a significantly new epistemology in his *Essay*, Locke forced a serious reconsideration of the relationship between rationality and religion. As such, he spent a considerable amount of effort attempting to ground faith in certainty despite his open modesty about what he considered to be the scope of our possible understanding. In the *Essay* and later in the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, Locke sought to do this by promoting what he termed a "reasonable religion," one not based on either religious enthusiasm or rationality but rather on "revelation guided by reason."³ Because so many religious doctrines seem to lie above the "agreement and disagreement of ideas"⁴ that he held to be the basis for certain, rational knowledge, Locke claimed that faith is ultimately grounded in divine revelation. Wary of religious enthusiasm, however, he couched this statement by also asserting that the claims of revelation

needed to be judged by “reason and scripture, unerring rules to know whether it be from God or no,” lest “inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood ... not be possible to be distinguished” (*Essay*, IV.xix.16). It is therefore neither inconsistent nor surprising that Locke chose to preface his subtly radical interpretation of the resurrection in the “Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester” by saying that he believed in “that particular Christian doctrine” on the basis of revelation “before I either writ that chapter of identity and diversity, and before I ever thought of those propositions which your lordship quotes out of that chapter.”²⁵

Stillingfleet’s main qualm with Locke’s theory of personal identity is that he believes it “undermines the notion” that, come the last judgment, we shall be resurrected “with the same body,” an idea that the bishop held to be “a primary article of faith.”²⁶ To properly evaluate the validity of Stillingfleet’s accusation, we must first arrive at an understanding of what Locke’s theory of personal identity entails and what, exactly, is the “article of faith” this theory is thought to undermine. In Book II of the *Essay*, Locke offers an account of identity that was quite different from the common understanding of identity existing in his day. Even before Descartes, it was taken for granted that there was a formal, two-fold distinction between a man’s immortal soul and his body, which is “comprised of flesh, susceptible to temptation and decay.”²⁷ Locke, however, offers a three-fold distinction which distinguishes not between body and soul but rather between the identity of a mass of matter, an organism, and a person. Because Locke holds both that “one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.1), he understands the identity of a body, which he defines as “two or more atoms joined together in the same mass,” to be incredibly fleeting. If a single atom is either added to or removed from a body then “it is no longer the same Mass, or the same Body” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.3). The identity of organisms, including “man,” is obviously not so fleeting, as it is defined by “nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.6).

Locke not only distinguishes the identity of a “person” from that of a “man;” he also goes to some length to argue that personal identity consists not in a continuity of metabolic processes (as does the identity of plants and “mere Brutes”) but rather

in a continuity of consciousness. Because a person is properly distinguished from a brute by her capacity to think, her consciousness “always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *Personal Identity* ... And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action of Thought, so far reaches the identity of that *Person*” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.12). This account leads to some very peculiar assumptions. For one thing, should I have an accident and experience complete and permanent amnesia, my continuity of consciousness therefore being broken, in Locke’s mind I should be properly considered to be a different person than the person whose existence “ended” with my memory loss. Conversely, Locke argues that should the “Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler ... he would be the same Person with the Prince” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.15). Despite his using a soul in this example, Locke even goes so far as to claim that consciousness is distinct from “thinking substances:” “if the same consciousness can be transferred from one thinking Substance to another,” he writes, “it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one person.” Locke does not think this possible, because a good God “will not ... transfer from one to another that consciousness, which draws Reward or Punishment with it” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.13), but the example serves to prove that Locke believes our personal identity is in no way related to either material or immaterial substances.

If Locke does not tie our personal identity to either bodies or souls, then it is quite clear why Stillingfleet would see this account as a threat to the Anglican belief that humans will be resurrected “with the same body:” if consciousness is distinct from our body then there is no reason to assume that a person shall be vitally united with the same mass of matter or organism she was united with in life. Realizing this, Locke first attempts to evade Stillingfleet’s criticism entirely by denying that resurrection “with the same body” is an article of faith at all. He claims that he does not “remember any place, where the resurrection of the same body is so much as mentioned in Scripture.”⁸ He reinforces this point by again noting that he does not consider things explicitly mentioned in Scripture as subject to the restriction of reason, and that “St. Paul would have put as short an end to all disputes about this matter, if he had said,

that there was a necessity of the same body [in the resurrection].”⁹ Since St. Paul does not, however, Locke claims that Stillingfleet is unjustified in “mixing your lordship’s interpretation of the Scripture with the Scripture itself.”¹⁰

In denying that we are resurrected with the same body, however, Locke was mixing his own philosophy with Scripture, and, as such, asserting the prominence of his reason-based interpretation over what he considered to be fallacious Church assumptions that fell outside the bounds of “reasonable religion.” This denial was more radical than Locke lets on, as it undermines both a significant aspect of Protestant theology as well as an idea which had been official Church doctrine for centuries. In denying the existence of Purgatory, a major point of division with Catholicism, Protestants were left with the rather odd problem of having to reconcile the immortality of the soul with its lack of a proper home after death. One common solution was to suggest that the soul and body went into a type of slumber and awaited Christ’s return, at which point the dead would be resurrected and judged.¹¹ The idea that we should be resurrected in our same bodies was important to the Protestant conception of penance as well. Whereas Catholics were able to conceptualize in Purgatory a place where the physical purging of sins occurred before the Last Judgment, Protestants—who in no way wished to abolish the purifying and purging qualities of penance—relied heavily on the writings of St. Paul, who says in several places that at Christ’s return we will “appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, so that everyone may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.”¹²

Although Anglican and Puritan theologians disagreed on how to solve the problem of exactly where the soul resides after death, they had long agreed that humans are to be resurrected in the same body. John Calvin speaks at length on this point in his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, saying that “the resurrection hoped for is that of the body, with Christ’s resurrection the prototype. The very importance of the matter should sharpen our attention, for Paul rightly argues that ‘if the dead do not rise up again ... the whole gospel is vain and fallacious.’” Having asserted the importance of this article of faith to Christian religion, Calvin concedes that “It is difficult to believe that bodies, when consumed with rottenness, will at length be raised up in their season.”¹³

The example of Christ's rebirth, however, renders as "brutish error" the idea that "the souls will not receive the *same bodies with which they are now clothed* but will be furnished with new and different ones ... Scripture [does not] define anything more clearly than *the resurrection of the flesh that we now bear*."¹⁴

Although Anglican theologians strayed from Calvin more than did the Puritans, they too strongly agreed with, among many other things, criticism of heretical sects like the Manicheans who denied resurrection of the same body. Their "foolishness was only proven by [this] denial," Anglican and Puritan thinkers agreed, because "We must hold fast to the fellowship between body and soul which the apostle proclaims ... for nothing is less likely than that *our flesh*, in which we bear about the death of Christ himself *and all of our sins*, should be deprived of Christ's resurrection."¹⁵ Anglican authors other than Stillingfleet also formulated their own, related reasons for believing in resurrection of the same body. For example, the influential Bishop Jeremy Taylor, roughly a contemporary of Locke, preached that at the resurrection sinners "shall receive their bodies so that they may feel the everlasting burning; they shall see Christ, that they may *look on him whom they have pierced* ... their bodies shall come from their graves, that they may go into hell."¹⁶ Taylor also strongly echoed Calvin in his claim that belief in resurrection of the same body is necessary because "the example of Jesus Christ makes it so."¹⁷ It is very doubtful that Locke was unaware of these ideas, as the English Church of Locke's time was vigorous in stamping out heresies, and one of the charges they made against a sect named the Levellers was that "they deny ... that our bodies shall be returned to us" at the Resurrection.¹⁸ In 1649, the controversial thinker Richard Overton similarly charged that the Church had "confiscated certain papers which were my former Meditations," wherein he questioned Church teachings on the resurrection of the body.¹⁹

Locke is therefore unfair when he accuses Stillingfleet of mixing his personal interpretation of Scripture, as Stillingfleet's claim that we are resurrected "with the same body" was not an article of his own making, but was rather a long-standing doctrine of the Church. At the same time, if Locke thinks that this debate revolves around bodies of matter, then his rejection of this doctrine is a simple extension of his account of identity. As explained above, Locke believes that a body in this sense

remains the same only while the particles of which it consists remain united. Therefore, the body a sinner had when he committed a given sin “was no doubt his body, though his body were not the very same body at those different ages: and so will the body which he shall have after the resurrection be his body, though it be not the very same.”²⁰ Locke could just as easily have said that the body of a sinner was not the very same body when he committed a given sin as it was when he took his next breath, and so if this is what Stillingfleet means by body then it would seem to be quite clear that Locke is undermining Church doctrine.

The Bishop’s view, of course, is not this straightforward, and he in fact agrees that masses of particles are constantly shifting.²¹ This does not seem to pose any problem for Stillingfleet, however, as he states that “certain particles of matter may be added [to a body] as many dead will suffer corruption” before the resurrection.²² Instead, the Bishop conceives of our body as being “not the same individual particles of matter which were united at the point of death, nor the same particles of matter that the sinner had at the time of the commission of his sins: but that it must be the same material substance which was vitally united to the soul here.”²³ Stillingfleet therefore seems to be linking the identity of our “bodies” more with what Locke refers to as the identity of “men,” which consists in “nothing but a participation of the same continued life ... in succession vitally united to the same organized body” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.5). Under Locke’s account, however, it is impossible for us to be resurrected as the same “man,” as our “same continued life” obviously ends at death. Because a thing cannot have two separate beginnings (*Essay* II.xxvii.2)—whatever “continued life” a person is vitally united with at the resurrection can therefore not be considered the same man as in life.

Locke does not seem to see Stillingfleet as precisely equating the man with which a person is vitally united to that person’s body, however. Instead, Locke thinks that Stillingfleet believes we must be resurrected with a body made of “the same individual particles of matter, which were, some time during his life here, vitally united to the soul.”²⁴ Because Locke was only truly committed to the claim that the bodies we have at the last judgment can neither be the same masses of matter nor be the same organism as those which were vitally united to our soul in life, it seems as though

he could have agreed with Stillingfleet on this point and perhaps avoided some of the Bishop's harsh criticism. Perhaps because he was so determined to stick to a conception of personal identity that depends solely on continuity of consciousness and not on *any* attachment to material or immaterial substance, however, Locke denies even this weaker conception of body. Locke argues, for example, that embryos who die before birth should be expected to receive entirely new bodies at the resurrection, lest they "remain a man not an inch long for eternity."²⁵ Elsewhere, Locke claims that our body at Last Judgment need not consist of a single particle to which we were vitally united in life, for "whatever matter is vitally united to [a person's] soul is his body, as much as is that which was united to it when he was born, or in any other part of his life."²⁶ And, in explicitly refuting the Bishop's claim that our bodies must consist of "some same pieces of matter" at the resurrection, Locke succinctly states that he "knows not in what sort of body we shall appear."²⁷

If Locke denies even this weak formulation of the claim that we are resurrected "with the same body," then Stillingfleet's belief that Locke's account of personal identity conflicts with standing Church doctrine is indeed justified. On the most basic level, Stillingfleet's accusation that Locke's account undermines several passages of Scripture seems validated. The Bishop notes, for example, a passage in which Jesus says that "all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth,"²⁸ which does seem to imply that the bodies we have at Last Judgment consist of at least some of the same matter, for "can a different substance be said to be in their graves, and come out of them?"²⁹ Far more important to Protestant theology, however, is that Locke's denial of this weak conception of "sameness of body" appears to contradict St. Paul's oft-quoted assertion that "we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that everyone may receive the things done in his body."³⁰ This alarms Stillingfleet, for it undermines the Church's need to assure "that we should receive punishment in our bodies for those things done in our bodies,"³¹ which all English clerics had long thought essential to assuring believers that they would receive proper desserts at Last Judgment.³²

Despite its centrality to Church doctrine and its direct contradiction of certain Biblical passages, Locke does not feel compelled to alter his position, as all he claims

the Scripture commits him to is the notion that a man's body is "his own at the Resurrection," which it will be as long as it is vitally united with his soul."³³ Oddly enough, this denial of even Stillingfleet's relatively weak version of Church doctrine leads to still more problems in attempting to reconcile Locke's account of identity with the resurrection. The bigger trouble for Locke is forming any conception of the resurrection that is consistent with both his account of personal identity and at least the very basics of Christian teachings. Because Locke does think that we are given physical form at the Last Judgment,³⁴ one way to perhaps do this is to suppose that he viewed the resurrection as the uniting of our consciousness with *some* body. This is somewhat consistent with the fact that Locke speaks not of the resurrection of either bodies or men but of "persons."³⁵ Because Locke is firmly committed to the idea that one thing cannot "have two beginnings," then perhaps he believes a person's consciousness continues after death, until it can "once again be vitally united with a body, which would then become our body."³⁶

If this were true, though, then where would our consciousness reside in the interim? Locke does not address this directly, but perhaps he thinks that one's consciousness remains vitally united to one's corresponding soul. But then where would that soul reside? He appears to rule out the solution offered by some Protestants—that the soul "sleeps" with the body—because he denies that the soul remains in the grave after death.³⁷ Perhaps Locke can instead be read as believing that persons and the immaterial substances to which they are vitally united wander the Earth, since neither Heaven nor Purgatory are an option, the former being closed to souls who have not yet paid for their sins and the latter being banished with the rest of Catholic doctrine. It is very doubtful that Locke would endorse such an idea, however, because the notion of wandering souls was something that was quite fervently denied by the Anglican Church until the nineteenth century, since the English people were thought to be particularly susceptible to a belief in ghosts, which was itself a minor heresy.³⁸

If this is not the case, then perhaps Locke believed that consciousness remains wedded to a physical substance between death and resurrection. If this were true, it might help to explain why Locke goes to such lengths to speak about the possibility

that “God can, if he pleases, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking” (*Essay*, IV.iii.6). Although this was an idea with which Stillingfleet also took particular issue, if viewed within this context perhaps the idea of “superadding thought to matter” can be seen as an attempt to resolve materialism with the continuation of persons after death. Even avoiding today’s debate about what exactly Locke’s superaddition entails, it is quite clear that Locke could not have used “thinking matter” as an explanation for the continuation of consciousness. Although he does say that “our body” is that body which is “vitaly united” to our person, if Locke thought it was matter which retains our consciousness after death then he presumably would not have denied, as he repeatedly does, Stillingfleet’s claim that our body at the resurrection must contain “some of the same particles [to which we were] vitaly united in Life.”³⁹ The only way to resolve Locke’s explicit rejection of this idea and the possibility that he would use “thinking matter” as a way to explain continuation of consciousness is to say that, at the Resurrection, God transfers our consciousness from one body of matter to another. This idea, however, is not just a blatant rejection of Church doctrine; it is also utterly bizarre, and the fact that Locke does not explicitly admit to holding such a position ought to lead us to quickly dismiss it as a possibility

If Locke would not have subscribed to the idea that consciousness continues united to either material or immaterial substance, we are left with two possibilities: that Locke thought consciousnesses can exist on its own, or that consciousnesses go out of existence at death and return at the resurrection. The former reading seems completely untenable, because although Locke detaches personal identity from any link to substance, he says at several points that because consciousness is “inseparable from thinking” it can only continue if it is united with a thinking substance, namely a soul or perhaps “thinking matter” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.9).

Therefore, the final way in which we might try to resolve Locke’s account of personal identity with the Anglican conception of the resurrection is to ascribe to him the claim that God brings persons somehow back into existence at the Last Judgment. In fact this idea fits quite well with a few of Locke’s statements in the *Essay*. He says, for example, that because the identity of a person reaches as far as that person’s memory “can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.9), “we

may be able without difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.15). Later on, he makes this point still more explicit: “Had I the same consciousness that I saw the Ark and *Noah’s* Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the *Thames* last winter, and that view’d the Flood at the general Deluge, was the same *Self*, place that *Self* in what substance you please, than that I write this am the same *my self* now ... that I was yesterday” (*Essay*, II.xxvii.16).

Although this interpretation aligns nicely with Locke’s own writing, it too has a number of inconsistencies. For one thing, although Locke does speak of the resurrection of “persons” specifically, he always does so by in the context of describing “persons” being “vitaly united with a body.”⁴⁰ If a consciousness suddenly came back into existence, then it would seem to violate Locke’s principle that “one thing cannot be said to have two beginnings and so it cannot be considered to be the “same” consciousness, which is not a claim Locke wants to make. Moreover, Locke clearly thinks that consciousness must be attached to a substance—“place that *Self* in what substance you please”—and as we’ve seen he cannot commit himself to saying that consciousness remains wedded to either a soul or a body after death. The “return” of consciousness is therefore not quite analogous to a person’s awaking from a coma or extended slumber, because in the latter cases consciousness remains attached some substance even while dormant. Because Locke did not speak at any length about this problem, this last inconsistency does not in itself weigh heavily on a vast corpus of writing that most historical philosophers admit is itself laden with an infamous number of contradictions and ambiguities. We have seen, however, that Locke’s theory of personal identity, especially in the strong form he defends in his correspondence with Stillingfleet, directly undermines ideas which were widely held by members of the 17th century Anglican church. This, combined with the fact that his account seems compatible with only a very vague and confusing conception of the resurrection, proves that, in at least one narrow but important case, his project of building a coherent, “reasonable religion” ought ultimately to be considered a failure.

Endnotes

- 1 This is an oft-cited feature of early modern Puritanism. See, for example, Everett H. Emerson, *English Puritanism from John Hooper to John Milton* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1968). See also John A. Passmore, *Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 90-96, which is cited in Samuel C. Pearson, Jr., "The Religion of John Locke and the Character of His Thought," in *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 58, no. 3 (July, 1978), 244-262, 244.
- 2 J.R. Milton, "Locke's Life and Times," in Vere Chappell, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Locke* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5-35.
- 3 John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, in *The Works of John Locke* (London: A Bettesworth, E. Parker, J. Pemberton, & E. Symon, 1727), vol. 2, 274.
- 4 John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV.i.1. All further quotations from the *Essay* are taken from John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
- 5 John Locke, *2nd Reply to the Bishop of Worcester*, in *The Works of John Locke*, 12th ed., vol. 4 (1823), 303.
- 6 Edward Stillingfleet, quoted in John Locke, *2nd Reply to the Bishop of Worcester*, 311, 317, 318.
- 7 John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1960), 986.
- 8 John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 303.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 312.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 308.
- 11 A nice summary of the shift in understanding regarding the fate of the deceased as the English moved from a Catholic to Protestant theology can be found in Peter Marshall, *Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- 12 2 Corinthians 5:10. The Protestant attempt to solve the quandary forced by their desire to retain the doctrine of penance while also eliminating Purgatory – which the Catholic church had used to circumvent the increasingly unwieldy doctrines of penance from the early Church – was a major point of interest during the early Reformation. See, for example, Jane Haeming, "Communication, Consolation, and Discipline in Reformation England," in *Penitence in the Age of Reformation*, Katherine Lundi and Anne T. Thayer, eds. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2000).
- 13 John Calvin, *Institutes*, 995-6.
- 14 John Calvin, *Institutes*, 998 (emphasis added).
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 Jeremy Taylor, *The Golden Grove: Selected Passages from the Sermons and Writings of Jeremy Taylor*, ed. Logan Pearsall Smith (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), 270.
- 17 Jeremy Taylor, *The Golden Grove*, 184.
- 18 Roger L. Emerson, "Heresy, the Social Order, and English Deism," in *Church History*, vol. 37, no. 4 (December, 1968), 389-403, 396.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 398.
- 20 John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 307.
- 21 Edward Stillingfleet, in John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 310.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 315.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 305.

24 John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 305.

25 John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 311.

26 *Ibid.*, 314.

27 *Ibid.*

28 John 5:28-29.

29 Edward Stillingfleet, quoted in John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 305.

30 2 Corinthians 5:10.

31 Edward Stillingfleet, quoted in John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 305.

32 William M. Spellman, "Almost Final Things: Jeremy Taylor and the Anglican Dilemma of the Dead Awaiting Resurrection," in *Anglican and Episcopal History*, vol. 62, no. 1 (March, 1994), 35-50.

33 John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 307.

34 See, for example, *Ibid.*, 309.

35 *Ibid.*, 317.

36 *Ibid.*, 330.

37 *Ibid.*, 304-5.

38 William of Malmesbury, for example, claimed that "So many Englishmen believe in the rubbish about wandering souls that the belief might be said to be virtually innate in the English nation." This sentiment was repeated as late as 1871 in formal Church writings. See Alexander Murray, *Suicide in the Late Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 478.

39 Edward Stillingfleet, quoted in John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 309.

40 John Locke, *2nd Reply*, 306.

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Moore's Paradox and
the Possibility of
Contradictory Beliefs

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G.E. Moore is credited with the observation that the absurdity of assertions such as “it is raining but I don’t believe it” is paradoxical, in the sense that the absurdity—so evident to the ear—is not easily explicable. After all, the truth-value of such sentences cannot be the source of the absurdity, as it may in fact be the case that it is raining and I don’t believe it. For the first conjunct of the Moorean sentence purports to describe a feature of the world independent of mental states, while the second conjunct limits its concern to a specific mental state of a certain individual in that world, and it is not at all clear why the content of one conjunct should place limitations on the content of the other.¹ Moreover, there seems to be nothing problematic about my asserting “it is raining, but you don’t believe it,” or “it is raining but I didn’t believe it,” or even “it is raining but I will not believe it” (imagine someone about to consume certain hallucinogens); the problem, rather, is limited to first-person present-tense assertions. Thus, while I may, without absurdity, contrast the state of the world with another person’s state of belief, or with my belief state at another time, there is something problematic about my contrasting, at least by means of assertion,² my present belief state with the present state of the world.

In what follows we will be guided by two necessary features of an adequate explanation of the absurdity of Moorean sentences. First, we will not merely be content with explaining the absurdity of assertions of the form “P, but I don’t believe P.” It is important to set straight at the outset that the absurdity prevails even when the assertion takes the form “P, but I believe that not-P.” The fact that there is a difference in meaning between the two sentences should be readily apparent, even though the distinction is not always respected in common discourse. In the first form, the second conjunct merely reports a lack of positive belief that P; in the second form, the second conjunct reports an actual belief that not-P. Since the only evidence of the absurdity of the first form (herein, Moorean sentence B) is strong unanimous intuitions, the fact that the second form (herein, Moorean sentence A) also seems to set off intuitional red flags is ample reason to expect an explanation in both cases. Second, the Moorean sentences are not only absurd when they are uttered assertorically. They are equally absurd when they are believed.³ One must only peruse one’s existing beliefs, and ask what it would take to believe a Moorean proposition, in order to

appreciate this claim. While we will not yet worry whether such beliefs are impossible and *therefore* absurd, or possible *yet* absurd, we will simply note that the absurdity exists, and demands explanation.

Although we will not rest until all four types of Moorean absurdities are explained, it is not obvious why one explanation that satisfies all four cases at once should be preferred *for that reason alone*. No doubt, such an explanation would be aesthetically pleasing, but aestheticism does not imply accuracy. Furthermore, if one can convincingly show that a single explanation is effective in all the cases, one's explanation deserves to be a contender in all the cases. Nonetheless, the mere fact of economy of explanation should not be a factor in endorsing an explanation. After all, while intuitions can teach us a lot, it is important to remember that they do not usually come attached with explanations. In our case, while our intuitions teach us that a given belief or assertion is absurd, they do not tell us why they are absurd. It follows that they do not even tell us that they are all absurd for the same reason; or more tentatively, if they do, then these latter intuitions should not be relied upon.⁴ I offer this paragraph entirely in the spirit of altruism, as the explanation I will now provide *does* have the *aesthetic* virtue of being applicable to all four cases under consideration. Specifically, I will claim that absurdity is located in *believing* the Moorean sentences, and that the absurdity of the assertion follows from the absurdity of the belief.

I Moorean Belief

I.a. An Initial Explanation

The theoretical difficulties are much easier to generate in the case of Moorean beliefs than in the counterpart case of Moorean assertions. In the case of belief, one need not rely on *implied* unexpressed propositions to identify the absurdity, as is often thought to be the case with Moorean assertion. Instead, the derivation runs as follows: Assuming that belief distributes over a conjunction (the only piece of doxastic logic that is not seriously challenged, and is therefore legitimately employed), the single belief that “it is raining and I don’t believe it” collapses into the belief that it is raining, and the belief that I don’t believe it is raining. These beliefs do not, of course, contradict each

other, as belief in the first conjunct comprises a first-order belief, while belief in the second conjunct constitutes a second-order belief (i.e. belief about a belief). Some proceed by arguing that a first-order belief entails a second-order belief, thereby producing an implied contradiction between the conjuncts, but such forays into the murky realm of doxastic logic are both controversial and gratuitous.⁵

Instead, we can begin by observing that Moorean sentence B has the peculiar property, such that my belief in the proposition it expresses is sufficient (though not necessary) to falsify it. After all, if I believe the sentence, then I believe that it is raining (in virtue of my belief in the first conjunct), which falsifies the content of the second conjunct, namely that I don't believe that it is raining. And since the falseness of one conjunct is sufficient for the falseness of the entire conjunction, first person belief in the Moorean sentence is sufficient to falsify the whole sentence (by "first person belief" I only mean to note the obvious, namely that only the referent of the "I" in the Moorean sentence has the power to falsify the sentence through belief in it; if Alex believes the sentence, but the "I" refers to Jon, then the belief isn't Moorean).

Before we turn to the ramifications of this peculiar property of Moorean sentences, we must perform the same analysis on the other type of Moorean sentence, "It is raining, but I believe it isn't." This time around, the theoretical difficulty that is generated is not as egregious, at least at first glance. Whereas first-person belief in sentence B guaranteed that sentence's falsity, first-person belief in sentence A guarantees that the sentence's truth depends on the believer having contradictory beliefs. If I believe sentence A, then I believe that it is raining (in virtue of belief in the first conjunct); and if the sentence is true, then I believe that it isn't raining (in virtue of the content of the second conjunct). Thus, if I believe it, and it is true, then I have contradictory beliefs. Put differently, to believe sentence A, that is, to think that sentence A is true, is to ascribe to oneself contradictory beliefs. Now, although contradictory beliefs cannot both be true beliefs, the fact that many of us harbor them is ample evidence of their possibility. Accordingly, sentence A can express a true proposition, even if I believe it. To recapitulate, belief in Moorean sentence B entails belief in a false proposition, whereas belief in Moorean sentence A entails *either* belief in a false Moorean proposition, *or*, if the Moorean sentence is true, contradictory

beliefs, which cannot both be true. Specifically, if the Moorean sentence A is true, then I have the false belief that it isn't raining.

Although the theoretical difficulties with believing Moorean sentences A and B are distinct vis-à-vis the Moorean sentence—since belief in sentence A *can* be a true belief while belief in sentence B *must* be a false one—they each impute the same theoretical violation to the believer. In either case, belief in the Moorean sentence is sufficient to prove that the believer has *a* false belief. Interestingly, in the case of sentence B, the belief in the first conjunct is what *causes* the falseness of the Moorean belief, since it falsifies the content of the second conjunct.⁶ Conversely, if sentence A is true, my belief in the sentence is not what falsifies the belief that is the content of the second conjunct; rather, it is the truth of the first conjunct, irrespective of my belief in it, which does the falsifying. In fact, in the rain example, the absurdity of Moorean sentence A serves no function. We usually know on independent grounds whether or not it is raining, and that fact alone, irrespective of whether or not the subject believes in it, is enough to falsify the belief that is the content of the second conjunct. However, if the truth value of the first conjunct is not obvious—perhaps, to serve this end, a better example would be the sentence “there is a God, I believe there isn't”—then belief in the Moorean sentence serves the function of demonstrating that the believer has either the false Moorean belief or contradictory beliefs, and therefore has at least one false belief, though we may not always be in a position to identify which belief it is.

We have already observed that Moorean sentences are absurd to believe and not merely to assert. We then asked what is responsible for the absurdity. Upon analysis, we managed to locate a peculiar feature of Moorean propositions. Although the propositions themselves are not necessarily false, the act of believing in them guarantees that the believer has a false belief. Some might therefore consider our task complete, at least with respect to Moorean beliefs. After all, we have shown that belief in the propositions, even without further empirical study, is sufficient to charge one with irrationality, that is, of holding beliefs that are *clearly* false.⁷ Though this line

of explanation is, I think, right in its essential components, it is insufficient and requires revision.

I.b. Problems with the Initial Explanation

The main problem is that, according to our interpretation, belief in Moorean sentence A may not be absurd at all; in fact, it may be rational if one knows oneself to be in the state of holding contradictory beliefs, both P and not-P. After all, Moorean sentence A is true if one holds contradictory beliefs, and it is surely not irrational to hold a true belief, so long as one arrives at this true belief through a rational process.⁸ Now, it is said, we all know that it is possible, and even likely, for one to have contradictory beliefs, *and* that one can have access to this fact about oneself, by becoming aware of beliefs that contradict each other (e.g., that man qua man was created by God, on the one hand, and evolved from monkeys, on the other). One's access to this fact about oneself provides the basis of the rational process by which one's acquisition of the true belief becomes, at the very least, not irrational (i.e., if I, in some way, perceive my contradictory beliefs, then I may legitimately form the belief that I have contradictory beliefs).⁹ Accordingly, the charge is launched that our explanation does not do justice to our intuitions, since our intuitions imply that "it is absurd always, everywhere and for anyone to believe any Moorean sentence," while our explanation allows that there is one situation, perfectly possible (or so the charge goes), in which such belief is perfectly rational.¹⁰ Suppose, for instance, that I have two beliefs, which I come to realize contradict one another. Nonetheless, since both beliefs are sufficiently important to me, I do not abandon either one of them, reconciling myself with my irrationality, with the condition that I will skillfully keep my irrationality under control. In such a case, the argument goes, I may rationally believe that I have contradictory beliefs. Indeed, such a belief might be necessary to keep my irrationality under control.

Furthermore, according to our explanation, the gross absurdity of believing Moorean sentences consists in the relationship of entailment that exists between believing a Moorean sentence and believing a false belief (the entailment only runs one way of course, from the former to the latter). Yet in the case of sentence A, as we have shown, one may not even be able to pinpoint which belief is the false one. And

unless one can identify a specific belief that shouldn't be believed it seems unfair to impute irrationality, let alone absurdity, on the believer for keeping his beliefs in tact. After all, if God came down to any one of us and told us that one of our beliefs were false, *without telling us which one*, it might make us recheck our reasoning, but it should not, by itself, make us abandon any one of our particular beliefs.¹¹

I.c. The Revised Explanation

Both of these challenges can be parried in a single move, by bringing to the fore certain details of the relationship between consciousness and belief. In the process, however, our explanation of the absurdity will be revised. Specifically, belief in Moorean sentences A and B will be shown to be *impossible* and *therefore* absurd. Accordingly, the above objections are constructive in the best sense of the word. Before I elaborate on my claim it would do us well to distinguish our position from another famous attempt to explain the absurdity of *believing* Moore's sentences by means of consciousness, namely Baldwin's (Heal 10).¹²

I.c.i. Baldwin's Views on Moorean Belief: Considered and Dismissed

According to Baldwin, the absurd Moorean beliefs in question are all conscious beliefs. This much seems reasonable. The intuitions that are at play in detecting the absurdity of Moorean belief seem to run from first-person beliefs to third-person. That is, one seems to consider what it would be like for oneself to believe a Moorean sentence, and once one concludes that such belief would be absurd (that is, once one's intuitional red flags are waved), one extrapolates that it would be absurd for anyone to believe a Moorean sentence, since there is no special reason that would make it absurd only for oneself to believe it that doesn't apply to others as well. Moreover, the first step in the process is not merely consideration of what it would be like for oneself to have the Moorean belief, but consideration that is conducted in a first-person way (i.e., one, in some strange way, considers what it would feel or look like to have these beliefs, and concludes it would be absurd).¹³ That is, one takes advantage of the special cognitive relationship one is capable of having only towards one's own beliefs, and it is from this vantage point that one detects the Moorean absurdities. Accordingly, Baldwin's point

is simply that one can only *consider* one's own beliefs in a first-person way, if one is conscious of those beliefs, and that therefore, one's intuitions in this case are only relevant to conscious Moorean beliefs. This, quite frankly, seems plausible.¹⁴ Accordingly, any extrapolation of our intuitional reading to the unconscious realm would require justification. Next, Baldwin offers an analysis of conscious beliefs, such that a conscious belief entails belief in the belief. With these two initial steps, Heal's Baldwin offers his explanation:

So let us suppose that I consciously believe "I believe that P but not P"...Then it follows that I consciously believe that I believe that P and I consciously believe that not P. So now, because of this second belief and in virtue of the consciousness, I believe that I believe not p. So I (consciously) believe that I believe p and I believe that I believe not p. If we are further allowed to take it that that any two beliefs (even if one is conscious and the other not) yield a belief in the conjunction of their contents, then I believe that I believe p and that I believe not p. So I believe that I have a contradictory belief (Heal 10).

We should first note that in addition to the dubious logic of the argument (which Heal brings to light in her second parenthetical statement), the entire analysis of conscious belief in terms of second-order belief is highly questionable. We all recognize that beliefs can be conscious or unconscious, since there are certain beliefs (such as beliefs in the truths of basic arithmetic) which we believe even when we are not reflecting on them (i.e. aware of them). Accordingly, for every belief, the question arises whether the belief is conscious or unconscious. Consequently, to analyze conscious belief in terms of believing in a belief is simply to beg the question. For one must always ask whether the second-order belief is itself a conscious one, and an infinite regress looms large. Perhaps it is true that consciousness of a belief puts one in a position from which one *can* form a belief of their belief,¹⁵ but Baldwin's analysis goes much further. Moreover, it is critical to realize that the conclusion of Baldwin's explanation, which deals with belief in Moorean sentence A, gets exactly as far as we got *before* invoking the language of consciousness, namely that belief in Moorean sentence A entails belief in contradictory beliefs. This does little to rejoin our challenge to explain the way in which belief in contradictory beliefs results in absurdity,

considering that contradictory beliefs are possible. Baldwin tries to cover for this gap by denying that a rational thinker can consciously harbor contradictory beliefs. Yet this answer falls up short, as Jones deftly illuminates: “one would like to hear more about rational thinkers; they had better not be defined as those who would not hold contradictory beliefs. Anyway, the point...is that Baldwin’s argument does not rule out the very possibility of one’s consciously holding contradictory beliefs—it is only that one has such beliefs at the expense of being irrational” (Jones 184). And if one *is* irrational, one is certainly not aggravating one’s sorry state by believing the Moorean statement. After all, at least one is behaving rationally by recognizing one’s irrationality; such behavior is more than we get from most irrational people, and should be encouraged, and not denounced as absurd.

I.c.ii. From Baldwin’s Explanation to my Revised Explanation

Whereas Baldwin denies that a *rational* thinker can consciously harbor contradictory beliefs, my suggestion is that *no* thinker can consciously have contradictory beliefs, since such a belief state is simply impossible. Before I defend this claim it is necessary to explore how this principle—that consciously held contradictory beliefs are impossible—, if correct, would solve the two challenges.

We have already given support to the claim that belief in Moorean sentences is only problematic when it is conscious. Nonetheless, this only entails, in the problematic case of sentence A, conscious belief that P, and conscious belief that I believe not P, and, as we well know, these beliefs are not, strictly speaking, contradictory. There are two possible paths to extract the conscious contradictory beliefs. One path is to claim that conscious second-order belief presupposes conscious first-order belief. Though this path is at first glance attractive, it is ultimately ineffective. I can form a second-order belief in two ways: I can either have direct introspective awareness of the first-order belief or I can perceive features about myself, perhaps about my behavior or my other sensations that indicate that I have a belief.¹⁶ Since this latter route—in which one adopts a “third-person” perspective towards oneself, and *infers* from one’s behavior that one has certain first-order beliefs—remains open, it is wrong to rely on the principle that conscious second-order belief entails conscious first-order belief. For the second

path allows that the conscious second-order belief may be belief about a first-order *unconscious* belief (which nevertheless has effects on one's behavioral dispositions). Nonetheless, the conscious second-order belief guarantees that one is, at the very least, conscious *of* one's first-order belief, whether or not that first-order belief is itself conscious.¹⁷ Accordingly, there are two specific beliefs—say, belief that it is raining, and belief that it is not raining—which are contradictory, and which, when I believe Moorean sentence A, I *consciously* regard myself as embracing. Although this does not strictly entail conscious contradictory beliefs—since, again, it is possible for the second-order belief to be obtained through inference and not direct awareness—it does entail that one be conscious *of* two contradictory beliefs (one of which isn't necessarily a conscious belief), and this is all we will need. For if it is impossible for one to be conscious *of* holding two contradictory beliefs, then belief in Moorean sentence A is impossible (assuming, for the moment, the correctness of my principle), since conscious belief in the first conjunct entails the impossibility of consciously believing the second conjunct. This is the case since a conscious second-order belief (i.e., conscious belief of the second conjunct) entails consciousness *of* the first-order belief, which, in the case of sentence A, would conflict with the conscious first-order belief in the content of the first conjunct. Thus, since one cannot consciously regard oneself as holding both contradictory beliefs, the moment one actually believes the first conjunct, one ceases to believe the second, and vice versa.

How, then, can we defend our principle that it is impossible to be conscious of two specific contradictory beliefs, and to continue to hold them? I think that the best explanation comes from the annals of *evidentialism*. Evidentialism's thesis is that a doxastic attitude's epistemic justification is determined entirely by the evidence that a person possesses. Specifically, according to Conee and Feldman, "Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t iff having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t" (83). Now, I am quite sympathetic to evidentialism as an epistemological theory. Yet, since it a controversial theory, it would probably be best not to assume its truth in an explanation of the absurdity of believing Moorean sentences. Moreover, the best such a line of argument can do is tell us that it is never epistemologically justified to hold contradictory beliefs, and our principle demands

more (namely the impossibility of consciously holding two contradictory beliefs). Nonetheless, I think that a premise of a certain (weak) argument for evidentialism can serve our precise purposes. The argument I have in mind is offered by Jonathan Adler, and the premise affirms the existence of a Crucial Fact. “Any account of the ethics of belief should cohere with a crucial fact, which is illustrated by the ancient challenge to believe that: the number of stars is even. We cannot meet this challenge. The crucial fact is that it is not possible that one both regard oneself as holding a belief and that one’s reasons for it are inadequate” (267). Specifically, the reasons Adler refers to are reasons to think that the proposition in question is true, not practical reasons that would make it appealing to believe them. Adler claims that this crucial fact supports evidentialism, since evidentialism can offer an explanation for it. “The explanation assumes that we grasp evidentialism’s requirement of adequate reasons (or evidence) as a conceptual condition for believing properly” (267). It is not my concern to argue for this latter claim, since, again, I do not purport to argue for evidentialism in this paper.¹⁸ That said, Adler’s crucial fact, if correct, goes a long way in defending my principle concerning the impossibility of contradictory belief. Before we see how this is so, let us quickly review Adler’s arguments for the reasonableness of accepting the crucial fact.

“The main reason to believe that the [crucial fact] is a fact is that we do follow it, and we find ourselves compelled to do so” (268). In other words, if one is both sincere and honest with oneself then one will accept that the Crucial Fact is indeed a fact. Beyond this claim, Adler observes that “we attribute acceptance of the crucial fact to others, at least for what they assert. If S asserts that p to H, H takes S to have good reasons to believe that p... The requirement that assertions be backed by good reasons, since they claim the truth of what is asserted, is just the analogue of the requirement that beliefs be backed by good reasons” (269).¹⁹ Moreover, we would surely not wish upon ourselves to be subject to the Crucial Fact if it did not truly exist (269). After all, it would, perhaps, be liberating to believe what we want to believe, that is, to choose a belief solely on the basis of the belief’s consequences, irrespective of whether we think we possess sufficient reason of its truth. Just think how many times one hears the phrase “I wish I believed in God, but I can’t.” Last, Adler invokes

psychological studies which consistently show that although people often acquire beliefs through causes that they either deny or don't know, the same people persist in offering rationalizations for their beliefs, and feel compelled to do so (269).

It has been brought to my attention that some people find the idea of the Crucial Fact implausible, for the reason that there seems to be a counterexample (notice of course, that the holders of this belief, like all others in my view, are prepared to supply a reason for their belief, namely the counterexample). The most convincing counterexample is supposed to be my conscious belief that my name is "Jed." If you ask me what my reason is I have nothing to go on. I can tell you that this is what certain other people call me, that this is the name on my driver's license, etc., but I don't really think that these are my reasons. This is because I do not actually rely on them. I don't say to myself "Well, if I am wrong about these things my name is probably not 'Jed.'" Thus, I offer no rationalization for my belief.

In my view, this counterexample is surmountable. The first step is to notice that if someone asks me whether I think that my belief that my name is "Jed" is arbitrary, I would say "no." Although it is in some sense arbitrary that my name is "Jed," it is not arbitrary that I now believe this to be the case. Thus, I believe that there is a reason that I believe that my name is "Jed." This is, of course, not enough to defeat the counterexample. I could believe that my reason is practical—perhaps that it is in my interest to believe that my name is "Jed"—and that this reason does not indicate the truth of my belief. This is, of course, not the case, as I believe that my reason indeed supports the truth of my belief. This is partly because I believe that there is no further fact to my name that is separate from people being able to successfully refer to myself by using it, so long as there was an initial baptism that is in some certain way "legitimate," and which is connected, perhaps in a causal chain, to the intentions of the person referring to me.²⁰ Since I have direct evidence that people can successfully refer to me when they use "Jed" with the right intentions, and since I have testimonial evidence that there was an intentional baptism that was legitimate in

the right ways, I believe that I have reason that evinces the truth of my belief that my name is “Jed.”²¹

I might only add that even if I were not able to articulate the supporting reason, I can still *regard myself* as having a reason which supports the truth of my belief. I think that it is quite possible for one to think that one understands something without being able to articulate it. At the very least, and this is really the crux of my response, I think it will be agreed that I must regard myself as *not* possessing a reason which would be adequate for the *falsity* of my belief. Since contradictory beliefs are, as we shall see, reasons supporting the falsity of the belief, this restricted version of the Crucial Fact is all that is indeed to accept my explanation of Moorean absurdity.

The Crucial Fact does not imply that one cannot believe a proposition without regarding oneself as possessing reasons for the proposition’s truth. Rather, it states that one cannot *regard oneself* as having a belief that is not backed up by any reasons. Once one regards oneself as having a belief, one can either regard oneself as having adequate reasons or cease having the belief. Moreover, the claim says nothing about the actual adequacy of the reasons that are offered. The important point, rather, is that one must *regard oneself* as having adequate reasons whenever one regards oneself as holding the belief. The moment one regards oneself as having adequate reasons one will, through that very regard, regard oneself as having a belief, and vice versa.

To be sure, all these considerations do not amount to a formal proof for the existence of the Crucial Fact. Nonetheless, many people will have trouble denying the Crucial Fact. After all, we have already noted the difficulty of believing, without empirical research, that the number of stars is an even number. And this is a belief which is as likely correct as incorrect, *against* which we have no empirical evidence, and which would challenge none of the normative practices which we value. If we cannot consciously believe that the stars are even without regarding ourselves as having reasons, then how could we fancy ourselves capable of consciously believing anything without regarding ourselves as having reason? The purpose of this paper—beyond laying out the structure of Moore’s paradox—is simply to make the observation that

the Crucial Fact, which we seem to intuitively accept, is all that is needed to solve Moore's paradox.

We are now in a position to defend our principle that one cannot regard oneself as holding specific contradictory beliefs. For if one is aware of the contradiction, one cannot possibly have *adequate* reason to think that either of the beliefs in question is true, as the Crucial Fact demands. This is not to say that one will always know which belief to declare false. Yet in such a case where one does not know which belief to reject, the Crucial Fact will *immediately and inevitably* lead one to suspend judgment in both cases.²² It is important that the contradiction be starkly evident in order for our principle to be effective. In other words, it is not good enough that one regards oneself as holding beliefs, which in actuality *imply* a contradiction. After all, we are not concerned with whether or not one has *actual* good reason to believe in a proposition. Rather, we are concerned with one's perceived reasons. And since we will not assume that belief that p implies belief that the consequences of p (such a piece of doxastic logic is most likely false: if one does not believe that p entails q, then one's belief in p will not entail a belief in q, even if p indeed entails q), we must be content with claiming that one cannot regard oneself as holding beliefs which are *explicitly* contradictory. This claim rests on the principle that being conscious of one's beliefs which are, in actuality, *explicitly* contradictory, will entail that one perceives the contradictoriness.

Clearly this last principle will be controversial. After all, what does it mean for a belief or a set of beliefs to be explicitly contradictory? If it simply means that the contradiction exists in the propositions themselves and not in any entailments of the contradiction, then it in no way follows that the believer, even when conscious of his beliefs, will *necessarily* be aware of the contradiction. If it means a contradiction that is obvious, it seems to be true that no obvious contradiction is *necessarily* obvious to everyone. If, alternatively, explicit contradiction simply means beliefs that are perceived by the believer to be contradictory, then the principle turns into a tautological one, to the effect that being conscious of one's beliefs which one perceives to be contradictory entails that one perceives them to be contradictory. All that said, I still think that there is a type of contradictory beliefs, which makes the principle significantly

true, which applies directly to the absurdity of Moorean beliefs, and which is still best called “explicit.”

We have already made the distinction between contradictions between actual beliefs, and contradictions between entailments of beliefs. There remains another important distinction to be drawn with regards to contradictions between actual beliefs. Let us imagine two beliefs, one that “this is an apple,” and the other that “this is an orange” (we will assume that there is no shift in context throughout the ensuing discussion, so that we can ignore the indexicals). Since there are, as far as I know, no borderline cases of apples or oranges, we will assume that if something is an apple it cannot be an orange, and vice versa. Accordingly, the two beliefs are contradictory. If all contradictory beliefs were like this one, then it would indeed follow that the principle is either false or trivial, for the reasons that we just gave. Nonetheless, it seems to be the case that there is another class of contradictory beliefs not yet accounted for. Specifically it seems highly plausible that with regard to the propositions expressed by “p” and “not-p,” when one consciously believes both, and understands the propositions in question, one will, through no extra steps, perceive the contradiction. For conscious belief in “not-p” is semantically equivalent to the conscious belief in “that which contradicts p.” When one consciously believes p and that which contradicts p, one believes, in virtue of the consciousness of the two beliefs (that is, of being conscious of both beliefs simultaneously), that one has contradictory beliefs. In the language of our examples, the set of beliefs “this is an apple” and “this is an orange” seems utterly distinct from the set of beliefs “this is an apple” and “this is not an apple.” I have not fully developed this distinction, and I shall be content with having gestured in its direction, in the hope that such a distinction makes my thesis significantly more plausible. This is the case, of course, since the contradictory Moorean beliefs in question are of the form “p” and “not-p.”²³

Since, as we have taken pains to show, conscious belief in Moorean sentence A entails that I consciously regard myself as holding specific explicitly contradictory beliefs (since the conscious second-order belief that I believe not-p carries with it, at the very least, a consciousness *of* the first-order belief that not-p, which explicitly contradicts my first-order belief in the content of the first conjunct, i.e. my belief that

p), and since, according to our principle, one cannot regard oneself as holding contradictory beliefs, it follows that conscious belief in Moorean sentence A is impossible. Put differently, conscious belief in the first conjunct entails that one does not believe the second conjunct, and vice versa.

Interestingly, it remains an open question whether the absurd belief of Moorean sentence B is even possible. I have been content with showing that belief in Moorean sentence B entails that one is mistaken in that very belief, but one may reasonably ask whether such a mistaken belief is possible. According to the Crucial Fact, the following seems clear: if I perceive the necessary falseness of belief in Moorean sentence B then such a belief, in virtue of the Crucial Fact, would not be possible. Thus, the question hangs on the possibility of one consciously believing Moorean sentence B without perceiving its necessary falseness. In the case of Moorean sentence B it is certainly reasonable to conclude that one must be aware of the necessary falseness (assuming, of course, that the beliefs are conscious), since one's belief in the first conjunct *directly* defeats the second conjunct, that is, explicitly contradicts the content of the second conjunct. Accordingly, given the Crucial Fact, conscious belief in either Moorean proposition is not only absurd, but also impossible. This jives well with our intuitions, which seem not only to sense an absurdity of Moorean beliefs, but to reject the *possibility* of such conscious beliefs altogether.²⁴

II Moorean Assertions

We may now turn to the second set of absurdities, namely the absurdities of *asserting* Moorean sentences A and B. To this end, we will employ, and defend, a position that Shoemaker lays out, namely that one cannot coherently assert a proposition that one cannot coherently believe (Shoemaker 75-6). Since we have shown that belief in either Moorean sentence is impossible, it follows that the beliefs are incoherent. Accordingly, if we successfully defend Shoemaker's view, then the absurdity in all four cases will have been successfully explained. Since Shoemaker's claim is not particularly controversial (Shoemaker does not even attempt a defense) my task should be relatively

manageable. Nonetheless, it will require determining certain facts about the relation between assertion and belief.

A popular Grice-inspired account also attempts to explain the absurdity of Moorean assertions by making certain claims about the relation between beliefs, intentions, and assertions. In order to situate my position, it will be effective to present a rough version of the Gricean account, and contrast that account with my own. According to the Gricean account, every assertion involves the intention, on the part of the speaker, to inform the audience of the content of the assertion. Now, as Baldwin explains, “since one cannot be understood as intending to inform someone that *p* unless one is believed by them to believe that *p*, the intention to be thus understood includes the [additional] intention to be taken to believe what one asserts” (Baldwin quoted in Heal 8). Accordingly, by asserting sentence B the speaker intends the audience to believe both that the speaker believes it is raining (in virtue of the additional intention applied to the first conjunct), and that he does not believe it is raining (in virtue of the primary intention applied to the second conjunct). Since this belief is contradictory, and cannot be entertained, the speaker’s intentions are necessarily frustrated. In sentence A, while the audience is not intended to have contradictory beliefs, it is intended to believe that the speaker has contradictory beliefs, namely that the speaker both believes it is raining, and believes it isn’t raining. Thus the speaker intends the audience to credit him with consciously held contradictory beliefs. In this case, the speaker’s intentions will be necessarily frustrated if the audience gives him the benefit of the doubt, and interprets his words in a way that would not impute him with contradictory beliefs.²⁵

Now, this Grice-inspired account does not attempt to link the absurdity of Moorean assertions with the absurdity of Moorean beliefs. After all, the self-defeating intentions which generate the absurdity for the Gricean account of Moorean assertion are unique to the case of assertion. As I remarked in the beginning, this fact alone should not stand against the Gricean account, so long as the account’s practitioners also account for the absurdity of Moorean belief. Nonetheless, the Gricean account does not even stand scrutiny on the question of Moorean absurdity. First, even if we agree that asserting a proposition involves the speaker’s intention to inform the audience

of the proposition that the sentence expresses, it does not follow that the speaker also has the *intention* for the audience to believe that the speaker believe the proposition as well. Even if it seems inevitable that the only way that the hearer will believe the proposition is if he thinks that the speaker believes it as well (and I am not convinced this is true), it does not follow that the speaker has the *intention* for the audience to have a belief about the speaker's belief (this would require a piece of intentional logic that ought not to be taken for granted). Since the absurdity, for the Gricean, consists in contradictory, or self-defeating, intentions, the Gricean line has more work to do.

Even if one thinks that an intention for x entails an intention for all necessary conditions of x, and even if one thinks, with Baldwin, that the speaker can only inform the hearer of the proposition (by means of the assertion) if the hearer believes that the speaker believes the proposition, the entire account rests on the view that assertions essentially involve the speaker's intention to inform the audience of the content of the assertion. This view is, I think, mistaken for several reasons. First, assertions are often purposefully made when it is known that the audience already is informed of the content. This happens when the speaker asserts an obvious truth, which he may do for many reasons, be it in run of the mill conversations ("it sure is hot out") or to teach people foreign languages (obvious truths serve as ripe opportunity for ostensive definition). Second, assertions are often purposefully made when it is known that the audience will not believe the content. This might happen if someone wishes to affirm or to acknowledge one's own unpopular opinions (if I assert in the philosophy lounge: "tax cuts on the top two percent will benefit the entire country"), or if the speaker deceptively intends for his audience to believe that he, the speaker, believes the content of the assertion (a deceptive assertion is still an assertion), knowing full well, and not caring, that the audience will not come to believe the assertion's content (imagine someone "playing dumb" after an accident which one was responsible for. For instance, if a construction worker burns down a building in the morning, and calls up his supervisor, who has already been informed of the accident but does not know who is responsible, at night and asserts that "the building looks great"). All this is not to say that assertions *cannot* be used to inform the hearer of the assertion, nor is it to assert that this isn't often the case. I only mean to argue that it is not *essentially* the case, and

since *all* Moorean assertions are absurd, the explanation which relies on the speaker's intention to inform the hearer of the content of the assertion is not adequate.

Nonetheless, the Gricean account which seeks to explain the absurdity by pointing out necessarily foiled speaker intentions is, I think, on the right track. For although it is tempting to define assertion simply as the expression of belief—since, in that case, propositions which are impossible to believe would be impossible to assert—doing so would miss the point of many assertions. As Shoemaker notes, the possibility of insincere assertions is all too evident (Shoemaker 74). The fact that such assertions—in which the speaker does not believe the asserted proposition, but wishes the audience either to believe the proposition, or to believe that he believes the proposition, or both—exist, is enough evidence to suggest that assertions cannot be defined solely as the verbal expression of belief. And the Gricean attempt, which emphasizes speaker intentions to inspire belief, is certainly a good alternative to the belief expression model, *insofar* as it preserves an essential connection between assertions and beliefs, while allowing for the possibility of insincere belief. Thus, on the one hand, we contest that the Gricean analysis of assertion remains fundamentally mistaken—it wrongly identifies the primary speaker intention as the intention to inform the audience of the content of the assertion—while, on the other hand, we agree that the Gricean insight of analyzing assertions in terms of speaker intention to instill beliefs in the audience is a powerful one. Accordingly, we must offer our account of the precise speaker intentions which are involved.

The counterexamples which we provided to the Gricean inspired account should serve as fertile ground from which to mine the appropriate intentions. A perusal of these examples makes it clear that the speaker intentions which Baldwin considered derivative—namely the intentions that the audience believe that the speaker believe the content of the assertion—are in fact the primary operating intentions. Accordingly, it seems fair to analyze assertions as a verbal speech act, in which a speaker utters a sentence with the intention that the audience believes that the speaker believes the content of the assertion. Perhaps this is not a full account, as several details may need to be added to it, but the fact that it seems capable of dealing with both sincere as well as insincere assertions serves as a likely indication that the core of

the analysis is correct. If it is indeed correct, then it has the added bonus of facilitating our explanation of the absurdity of Moorean assertions in terms of the absurdity of Moorean beliefs.

Quite simply, if the speaker has the intention of instilling in his audience the belief that he, the speaker, has a certain belief *x*, then belief *x* must at least be a possible belief. Belief *x* is always, according to our analysis of assertion, the belief in the proposition that is being asserted. In the case of Moorean assertions, the belief *x* is belief in propositions expressed by Moorean sentences A and B. Since the greater portion of this essay established that Moorean beliefs are impossible, no audience will believe that anybody, even the speaker, is capable of harboring such beliefs. Accordingly, the speaker's intentions, which constitute the essential element of assertions, will be necessarily frustrated when he utters assertorically Moorean sentences A or B. In effect, then, no assertion will have been made. Accordingly, we have effectively accounted for the absurdity of Moorean beliefs and Moorean assertions in one fell, albeit complicated, swoop.*

Endnotes

* Many thanks to Professor Zoltan Szabo for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1 This is, of course, just an easy way of describing the problem that is conducive to the rain example. In fact, one may, perhaps, offer other Moorean sentences in which the first conjunct does aim to describe a feature about my mental states, such as: "I believe that it is raining, but I don't believe that I believe it is raining." (The fact that this latter sentence, when asserted, is absurd, does not, of course, imply that when I believe *x*, it inevitably follows that I believe that I believe *x*.)

2 The problem, at least at first glance, seems limited, amongst speech acts, to assertion. There is no problem, for example, with my supposing a Moorean sentence, such as "suppose it is raining, and I believe it isn't."

3 I do not mean to be taking a stand on whether one can or cannot believe sentences. Here, and throughout the paper, when I say "belief in Moorean sentences," please take this as shorthand for "belief in the propositions expressed by Moorean sentences." My arguments do not, of course, hinge on this debate, one way or the other.

4 That is, we shouldn't trust further intuitions which compare different absurdities, if the original intuitions themselves carry no information which can be used as a basis for such a comparison.

5 This is not to say that such explanations cannot be made to work. I just mean to note that since it certainly doesn't follow logically that first-order beliefs entail second-order beliefs, deriving such a relationship of entailment will require serious assumptions about the nature of

consciousness and beliefs, all of which are likely to be controversial. Since my explanation does not require any such assumptions, relying on those assumptions seems gratuitous, and at the very least, controversial.

6 In an earlier draft, I mistakenly wrote that “the belief in the first conjunct is what *causes* his false belief.” I did not mean that the *belief* was caused by the first conjunct, but only the falseness. Indeed, my interpretation stays neutral about which (if any) of the thinker’s mental states are causes of others. This neutrality is a virtue of my reading.

7 The simplicity of the argument is a necessary ingredient in the charge of irrationality.

8 It is possible to argue that it is not in fact rational to believe all true beliefs. For example, it might not be rational to hold a belief if it is known that holding the belief is likely to cause the believer pain. Without delving too deeply into such objections, I would claim that such objections confuse practical rationality with theoretical rationality.

9 The principle underlying this claim is: for all true propositions *p* and all agents *a* if there is a rational process whereby *a* can come to believe that *p* then it is not irrational for *a* to do so.

10 Similar objections are made by both Heal and O.R. Jones towards the Gricean account of explaining the absurdity. To quote Jones, “[Some say] that it is absurd for a speaker to intend an audience to credit him with inconsistent beliefs. Still, it is *prima facie* possible for to have inconsistent, even contradictory, beliefs. Certainly establishing the contrary is not a simple task...And if the possibility of contradictory beliefs is left open, then the possibility of the allegedly absurd intention has to be allowed as well” (Jones 184). It is quite clear that the objection is different from mine, insofar as it relies on notions such as intentions, which have no place in my account. Nonetheless, it is easy to see how I was inspired to ask a similar question in my case.

11 We will, of course, soon reexamine the claim that belief in Moorean sentence *A* is equivalent to this God story. Specifically, we will deny that it is, since in the case of believing Moorean sentence *A*, one believes that a specific set of beliefs are contradictory, and not merely that “some of my beliefs are contradictory.”

12 Oddly enough, Cornell library does not own a copy of Baldwin’s book. Since I have no reason to doubt Heal’s presentation of Baldwin’s views, I will continue calling them Baldwin’s views. At the very least, they are simply Heal’s Baldwin, which should be enough to warrant consideration.

13 This follows from our two-step conception—from first-person to third-person—of the recognition of Moorean absurdity. If our consideration of our own belief is performed in a third-person way, there is no reason that one should start with one’s own belief, and look outward. Instead, the fact that we have a unique vantage point in considering our own belief—that is, the first person way—is what legitimates the two step conception.

14 This clearly needs to be defended in greater detail. Nonetheless I think I have made it plausible enough to stand on its own for the present purposes.

15 Rosenthal suggests just as much (Rosenthal 319).

16 This latter method of second-order belief acquisition is, I think, especially employed by religious believers.

17 I borrowed this distinction between consciousness of a belief and conscious beliefs from Rosenthal, who employed the distinction in an entirely different way (Rosenthal 316-320).

18 Moreover, it is my suspicion that non-evidentialists can accommodate this crucial fact, and it is therefore not the best basis to argue for evidentialism. The reason for my suspicion is that the leap between the Crucial Fact and any epistemological thesis seems wholly speculative. Perhaps,

for instance, there is an evolutionary explanation of the Crucial Fact. If there is, then the pervasiveness of the fact should not be offered as justification for an epistemological theory.

19 We will return to the case of assertion in more detail towards the end of this paper.

20 The bounds of legitimate initial baptisms are narrower in the case of human names than names of other entities. Even though there is a real sense in which a nickname is a name, when we talk about our names, we mean names in a more official sense (I am, of course, leaving this vague). Each society possesses their own criteria concerning what makes the initial baptism legitimate in the case of humans.

21 Technically speaking, even if my theory of names is the wrong one, the fact that I believe it to be true is enough for me to *regard myself* as having truth-indicating reason for believing that my name is “Jed.”

22 This may be thought to conflict with what was said earlier, namely: “After all, if God came down to any one of us and told us that one of our beliefs were false, without telling us which one, it might make us recheck our reasoning, but it should not, by itself, make us abandon any one of our particular beliefs.” Nonetheless, there is no conflict. In the God case, God does not tell us which particular beliefs are contradictory (or false). If he did so, we would have reason to suspend judgment with regard to those propositions. Rather, God told us that one of our myriad beliefs is false.

23 The form need not always be explicit, and may sometimes be embedded. For example, there are some words that mean “not-p” even though the word itself is in a different form. For instance, the sentence “there is a God but I am an atheist,” is, in my view, a Moorean sentence A, since “I am an atheist” is semantically equivalent to “I believe that there is not a God.”

24 One might ask, what about all the cases in which people claim to believe that they have conscious contradictory beliefs (e.g., creationism and evolution)? Quite frankly, in my view all such claims are either insincere or false. Since I think that many people sincerely believe their claim, I am committed to the view that people can be wrong about their own second-order beliefs. I am not uncomfortable holding this view. Sometimes wishing that one believes something can lead people to think they actually do believe something. This may happen if someone confuses supposition for belief. Other times one makes false judgments based on one’s third-person view of oneself, and mistakenly thinks that one believes something, when one in fact doesn’t.

25 Interestingly, this Gricean account will be improved by accepting the Crucial Fact. After all, if nobody *can* hold consciously contradictory beliefs, then the audience will definitely find another way to interpret his words, and therefore frustrate the speaker’s intentions.

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• *Logos Essay Contest Winner* •

Things are Their Parts

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Mereology is a theory about part-whole relationships, or how things have parts. The formulation of mereology by Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman rests on the thesis of unrestricted composition.¹ In short, the thesis says that whenever x and y exist, there is a fusion, or mereological sum, of x and y. For most people, this is hard to accept because they would have to make the additional ontological commitment to the existence of gerrymandered composite things like the fusion of Eiffel Tower and Fenway Park. Some proponents of unrestricted composition want to claim, however, that the additional ontological commitment is only illusory if the thesis of composition as identity is true. In David Lewis' terms, the theory is ontologically innocent.

Composition as identity says the fusions are, in some sense, identical to their parts. There are two versions of composition as identity. The weak version, as defended by Lewis, says the relationship between the parts and their fusion is *analogous* to the identity relationship. The strong version, as defended by Donald Baxter, says the relationship between the parts and their fusion *is* the identity relationship.² In other words, things *are* their parts. The combination of unrestricted composition and composition as identity says that if you accept the existence of Eiffel Tower and Fenway Park, then it is not a further ontological commitment to accept their fusion, because the fusion is merely those two things.

The picture becomes yet more complex when the dimension of time is considered. For example, a four-dimensionalist, who believes that things persist through time by having temporal parts, must think about how mereology applies to these temporal parts. In what sense does a four-dimensional entity like a human being that is composed of different sets of molecules at different times have parts? And in virtue of what are those to be called "parts" of the four-dimensional entity?

In the paper "Things and Their Parts", Kit Fine proposes his theory of rigid and variable embodiments that answers these questions about composition of material things. He rejects the view of the part-whole relationship that descends from Leonard and Goodman. Since that view is intimately linked to composition as identity, his rejection of mereology also entails the rejection of composition as identity.

My interest in this paper is to defend strong composition as identity, and Fine's paper will act as an entry-point to the discussion. I shall first explain his project

and present his examples that aim to show the inadequacy of traditional mereology. Then, I shall examine the differences between strong and weak composition as identity. I will argue the strong version has more metaphysical benefits. I will also respond to objections in the literature against strong composition as identity. Finally, I shall return to Fine's examples and explain how the theory of rigid and variable embodiments presents a solution to the problems posed by those examples. However, Fine's theory is not the only plausible solution to the problems that his examples raise.³ A theory that combines strong composition as identity, unrestricted composition and four-dimensionalism can also resolve those difficulties. Furthermore, it should be favored over Fine's theory because it is ontologically innocent and theoretically simpler.

I. Two Counterexamples to Mereology

Fine thinks that there are two kinds of parthood relationships: temporary and timeless. First, the parthood relationship could be relative to time; for example, the newly installed carburetor in my car is currently a part of my car. Second, the parthood relationship could be *simpliciter*, or not relative to time; for example, the hydrogen atoms and the oxygen atom are parts of the H₂O molecule. Only the latter notion of parthood is used in traditional mereology. Ultimately, Fine wants to provide a theory that gives us a better understanding of material things. To begin with, he gives an example of timeless parthood and an example of temporary parthood, and aims to demonstrate that traditional mereology is incapable of handling either notion of parthood.

The first case concerns a sandwich that is timelessly composed of two slices of bread, s_1 and s_2 , and a piece of ham, h . Under traditional mereology, which follows from composition as identity, the sandwich is just a fusion of s_1 , s_2 , and h . Fine considers two views of the fusion. When it is seen as a compound sum, the parts that make up the sum can only be spatial parts, not temporal parts. The compound exists only when all of its components exist. Hence, the sandwich exists when the slices of bread and the piece of ham are in existence, regardless of how they are arranged. However,

since I am only interested in Fine's critique of traditional mereology, it is more important to consider the relevant view of sums as aggregates.

The aggregate view says the sum exists whenever any of its components exist. Consequently, the sandwich begins to exist when just one of its parts exists. When the slice of ham comes into existence, the sandwich also comes into existence. Like the compound view, however, the aggregate view also clashes with our everyday notion of *making* a sandwich. Intuitively, the sandwich only exists when the ham is placed between the slices of bread. It should not exist when there is just the piece of ham, and the slices of bread do not exist yet.

Fine suggests a strategy that "restricts" $s_1 + s_2 + h$ to the times at which the sandwich exists.⁴ Then clearly, the existence condition would be correct. However, it is not clear in what sense are s_1 , s_2 , and h parts of the sandwich because the sandwich is no longer just their sum. In addition to the part-whole relationship, composition is characterized by an additional condition of time, i.e. when the fusion exists. If that additional condition is needed to explain composition, then the slices of bread and piece of ham cannot be termed "parts" of the sandwich, at least under the mereological view of the part-whole relationship. Hence, defenders of traditional mereology would not accept this revision.

Furthermore, Fine presents a modification to the example that makes the problem even more apparent. Suppose that instead of the ham, there is a monstrous object m composed of the ham and all objects that exist before and after the sandwich exists. Then, restricting $s_1 + s_2 + m$ to the times at which the sandwich exists would also yield the existence of the sandwich. If before the modification, we want to claim that the ham is a part of the sandwich, then it follows that m is a part of the sandwich. Of course, no one could possibly believe this monstrous object is part of the sandwich. Thus, the problem with this strategy is highlighted by the monstrous object objection. It seems there are no ways to understand the notion of mereological sum to adequately account for the relationship between timeless parts and wholes.

Fine then argues that the notion of mereological sum also cannot account for the relationship of temporary parthood. Consider the example about the newly installed carburetor in my car. Both the carburetor and the car have time-slices, like

the temporal parts of four-dimensionalism. At the current time t , the temporal parts are called carburetor-at- t and car-at- t , respectively. For the purpose of this example, suppose that the traditional mereological view also has an adequate account of timeless parthood. According to Fine, traditional mereology says the carburetor is currently a part of my car if and only if carburetor-at- t is timelessly part of car-at- t . This claim can be generalized to the “temporary part” principle: x is (temporarily) part of y at t if and only if x -at- t is timelessly part of y -at- t .

Although this seems far more intuitive than any of the mereological sum accounts for timeless parthood, it too cannot escape the monstrous objection. The monstrous object is composed of carburetor-at- t and all the things that exist before and after t . The temporal part of this monstrous object at t is just carburetor-at- t , which is the same as the temporal part of the carburetor at t . Hence, from the “temporary part” principle, since carburetor-at- t is timelessly part of car-at- t , the monstrous object is temporarily part of the car at t . Again, it seems absurd that this monstrous object could temporarily be a part of my car.

The intuitions at work in these two cases are not the result of the strangeness of the monstrous object. Traditional mereologists would gladly admit that these monstrous objects exist, because their existence follows from the principle of unrestricted composition. If carburetor-at- t exists and all the things that exist before and after t also exist, then the fusion of them – the monstrous object – exists. Let the fusion of car-at- t and all the things that exist before and after t be called monstrous-object-prime. From the “temporary part” principle, the monstrous object that contains carburetor-at- t is part of monstrous-object-prime at t . In this case, however, our intuition agrees. Therefore, the earlier disagreement between our intuition and the principle could not be because of the strangeness of the monstrous object in the example.

These two examples show that traditional mereology does not have an adequate account for either timeless parthood or temporary parthood relationships. Therefore, according to fine, the traditional notion of mereological sum should be rejected. There needs to be something more than the part-whole relationship to explain composition. If the compositions need some additional condition, then the fusions cannot be identical to their parts. Hence, the sandwich case and the car-carburetor case are also

counterexamples to the thesis of composition as identity. In order to defend that thesis, I shall first carefully distinguish the two forms of composition as identity.

II. Strong and Weak Composition as Identity

In the beginning, I claimed that weak composition as identity takes composition to be *analogous* to the identity relationship, but in what way? The view's most prominent defender David Lewis writes, 'So striking is this analogy that it is appropriate to mark it by speaking of mereological relations – the many-one relation of composition, the one-one relation of part to whole and of overlap – as kinds of identity. Ordinary identity is the special limiting case of identity in the broadened sense.²⁵ Both composition and ordinary identity are particular sorts of this extended sense of identity, and so they share many aspects.

The first aspect is ontological innocence, meaning that accepting the principle would incur no further commitment in the existence of things. It is redundant to say I exist and then say something that is identical to me exists. Likewise, under this view of composition, it is redundant to say the fusion of x and y exists after saying that x exists and y exists. The second is unrestricted composition. When I exist, something identical to me exists. Likewise, whenever x exists and y exists, the fusion of x and y exists. The third is uniqueness of composition. There cannot be two things that are identical to me because identity is transitive, and if the two things are both identical to me, then they are identical with each other, which means that they are one. Likewise, if there are two fusions A and B that are both composed of x and y, then A is the same fusion as B. The fourth is the ease of description. In order to describe something that is identical to me, I just need to describe me. Likewise, in order to describe the fusion of x and y, one only needs to describe x and then describe y. The last aspect is location. Something that is identical to me is located wherever I am located. Likewise, an object is located wherever its parts are. These are the five aspects by which composition is analogous to identity, according to Lewis.

The most notable advantage of weak composition as identity is the mathematical power it brings. Under Lewis' view, composition is disanalogous with

identity in one significant aspect. In the case of identity, the two sides of the identical symbol are indiscernible. In the case of composition, there are many parts, and only one fusion.

Since one side is plural and the other is singular, the parts are discernible. In that sense, the relationship between the fusion and the parts is actually more like the relationship between sets and its members. A singleton is a set that only contains one member. The set containing only the fusion is a singleton, but the set containing the parts is different because it is not a singleton. That is how Lewis formulates a mereology based on class theory, similar to set theory. Because we already have extensive mathematical knowledge in class theory, if mereology can be explained in those mathematical terms, that would be beneficial to our understanding of the part-whole relationship.

However, it is not clear whether the analogy truly holds between composition and identity, especially concerning the most important aspect, ontological innocence. Byeong-Uk Yi (in Yi 1999) advances an argument against the ontological innocence of weak composition as identity. Suppose the following is true: (1) there is a cat; (2) there is a mouse; and (3) no cat is a part of a mouse and no mouse is a part of a cat. If mereology is accepted, then two true statements that follow from those truths are: (4) there is something that is not identical with either the cat or the mouse; and (5) there is something that is neither a cat nor a mouse. In other words, someone who accepts mereology would have the ontological commitment of accepting the existence of a distinct kind of things that does not directly follow from (1), (2), or (3). Thus, weak composition as identity does entail further ontological commitments, and is therefore not ontologically innocent like the identity relation.

Someone who accepts strong composition as identity, though, could resist this argument. Accepting mereology entails accepting that from (1) and (2), there is a fusion of the cat and the mouse. Since composition is the same as identity, that fusion is just identical to the cat and the mouse, and that incurs no further ontological commitment. Furthermore, by accepting the existence of the cat and the mouse, you are already accepting that there is a kind of thing that is not identical with either the cat or the mouse, namely the fusion of the two. Hence, (4) and (5) are just redundant.

Clearly, this is the only option to preserve ontological innocence, and we should abandon weak composition as identity in favor of the strong version.

Strong composition as identity claims that composition is no longer merely analogous to identity, but it is the same as identity. What does that really mean, though? Let us take this essay as an example. Suppose this essay is composed of page 1, page 2, page 3... and so on. This is not to say that this essay is identical to page 1 *and* this essay is identical to page 2... and so on. The correct understanding is that this essay is composed of page 1 *and* page 2 *and* page 3... and so on. It should be understood that the whole is identical to the conjunction of the parts, rather than that there is a conjunction of identities between the whole and individual parts.

Although strong composition as identity does not have the mathematical benefits of the weaker version, it has more metaphysical benefits. As seen above, it preserves ontological innocence. It also explains the necessity of unrestricted composition because it is logically necessary that for any *x*s, there are some *y*s identical to the *x*s. Strong composition as identity says that the *y*s are identical to their fusion *y*. Since identity is transitive, it is logically necessary that for any *x*s, there is some *y* identical to the *x*s. But note, that is precisely the thesis of unrestricted composition. Hence, it follows from strong composition as identity that unrestricted composition is necessary.⁶ If someone does not accept unrestricted composition, however, that purported advantage of strong composition as identity actually makes it harder to accept than its weaker counterpart. Below, I consider four important arguments against strong composition as identity, and respond to the arguments in its defense.

The first objection concerns the verb used to express the identity relation. Here are two perfectly grammatical sentences: 'the sandwich is the sandwich,' and 'the sandwich is two slices of bread and a piece of ham.' If composition as identity is true and the proposition expressed by the second sentence is true, then the first 'the sandwich' in the first sentence could be substituted with 'two slices of bread and a piece of ham'. The resulting sentence, 'two slices of bread and a piece of ham is the sandwich,' however, is ungrammatical. Thus, someone who accepts strong composition as identity must adopt hybrid verbs such as 'is/are' or 'be' for the sentences to be grammatical in English when the plural term is substituted with the singular or vice versa. Peter van

Inwagen, though, thinks these hybrid verbs are unintelligible, and therefore a problem for strong composition as identity.⁷

In response, it is important to note that in some other languages, such as Chinese, there are neither grammatical distinctions between the verbs ‘is’ and ‘are’ nor between plural and singular terms. Therefore, the hybrid verbs are perfectly intelligible to the native speaker of Chinese. In fact, it is the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘are’ that he would have trouble understanding. More importantly, the correct metaphysics ought not depend on the language used in analysis.⁸ Hence, any linguistic consideration should be secondary to the theoretical considerations and the various kinds of benefits resulting from the theory. Nevertheless, there are two further concerns resulting from language.

First, consider the relationship expressed by ‘is one of’.⁹ Normally, it is followed by a plural term, such as in the sentence ‘the sandwich Fat Cat is one of the best sandwiches in United States.’ However, the relationship would still hold even if the predicate is followed by a singular term, such as in the sentence ‘Fat Cat is one of Fat Cat.’ Even though this does not seem to be grammatically correct, it is nevertheless intelligible, and means something like ‘the set Fat Cat is a subset of the set Fat Cat.’ The difference between the two uses of ‘is one of’ is akin to that of a subset, where the former is a proper subset, and the latter is not a proper subset, but a subset nevertheless. Now suppose that Fat Cat is composed of bread, chicken fingers, and mozzarella sticks. It seems that while the sentence ‘Fat Cat is one of Fat Cat’ is true, ‘Fat Cat is one of bread, chicken fingers, and mozzarella sticks’ is false. Therefore, the use of the predicate ‘is one of’ seems to suggest that strong composition as identity is false.

The second linguistic concern is in the same spirit.¹⁰ Suppose the sentence ‘Tom, Dick and Harry carried the casket’ expresses a true proposition. Let Tick be the fusion of Tom’s head and Dick’s body, let Darry be the fusion of Dick’s head and Harry’s body, and let Hom be the fusion of Harry’s head and Tom’s body. The proposition expressed by ‘Tick, Darry, and Hom carried the casket,’ however, is simply false. This example seems to hint that a certain unique division of the parts of Tom, Dick and Harry is needed for the predicate ‘carried the casket’. Of course, a consequence of strong composition as identity is that no way of combining parts is

privileged. Hence, this example also suggests that there is something wrong with strong composition as identity.

A response to these two distinct but related concerns turns on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference. The sense of a word or a phrase is its meaning and its modes of presentation, whereas its reference concerns with what it refers to. It is possible for two words or phrases to have the same referent, but different senses. For example, 'David Lewis' and 'the author of *Parts of Classes*' refer to the same thing, but they clearly have different meanings. That is why 'David Lewis is David Lewis' is a trivial sentence, while 'David Lewis is the author of *Parts of Classes*' is a meaningful sentence. In both sentences, the terms have the same referent, but in the trivial sentence, they also have the same sense, where as in the meaningful sentence, they do not. The difference in senses is what makes the latter sentence meaningful. While our linguistic concerns involve both sense and reference, our ontological concerns only involve the objects that the words refer to.

After making that distinction, it is clear that while 'Fat Cat' and 'bread, chicken fingers, and mozzarella sticks' have the same referent, they have different senses. Consider the case of the Morning Star and the Evening Star, and apply the predicate 'is one of' similarly. As expected, 'the Morning Star is one of the Morning Star' appears to be true. However, 'the Morning Star is one of the Evening Star' seems to be intuitively false, at least at the first glance. We would not infer from this that the identity between the Morning Star and the Evening Star is false. While this case is not a parallel because both the Morning Star and the Evening Star are singular terms, it is nevertheless illuminating. There seems to be something weird about the predicate 'is one of' that separates it from other logical terms. The predicate 'is one of' behaves like intentional verbs 'believes' and 'thinks', and that is why senses of the terms matter.

With that understanding, the argument from 'is one of' does not further the debate about whether strong composition as identity is true. If it is, then 'Fat Cat' and 'bread, chicken fingers, and mozzarella sticks' are co-referential, and 'Fat Cat is one of bread, chicken fingers, and mozzarella sticks' is true. If strong composition as identity

is false, then that sentence is false. The example merely draws out one's initial intuitions on the issue.

Similarly, while 'Tom, Dick, and Harry' and 'Tick, Darry, and Hom' have the same referent, they have different senses. Perhaps the predicate 'carried the casket' is a term that could only be applied to natural objects, like Tom, Dick, and Harry, and cannot be applied to the gerrymandered objects like Tick, Darry, and Hom. So, the predicate is sensitive to the sense of the word that it is applied to. Suppose there is another predicate, carried-prime, which means the same as carried, but is only sensitive to the referents. Then, the sentences 'Tom, Dick and Harry carried-prime the casket' and the sentence 'Tick, Darry, and Hom carried-prime the casket' would have the same meaning and the same truth value. Hence, the initial concern was just the result of the nature of the predicates we normally use, because they are sensitive to senses as well as referents.

The last objection is that accepting strong composition as identity results in denying the plural quantification interpretation of second-order logic. This is the strongest argument because it is not a linguistic consideration, but unfortunately it is also the most technical. The details can be found in (Sider MS). In short, some of the theorem schemas in standard second-order logic would not hold because the plural variables do not function as they are supposed to.

I am inclined to simply bite the bullet on this one. The metaphysical benefits derived from strong composition as identity are more important than the logical benefit lost. There are also other competing interpretations of second-order logic, and perhaps it is possible for a logician to work out a version that would preserve some benefits of plural quantification, and is still consistent with the strong composition thesis. Alas, I am not that logician. So I leave this objection open, but noting that even if the objection holds, it is not devastating for strong composition as identity.

If we accept this, then none of the standard objections refute strong composition as identity. Furthermore, we should accept the strong version over the weak version because the strong version has greater metaphysical advantages. Bearing this in mind, we can return to Fine's problems. First, I shall explain Fine's own solution, the theory of rigid and variable embodiment. Then, I shall also give my own solution

as someone who believes in strong composition as identity, unrestricted composition and four-dimensionalism.

III. Two Solutions to the Counterexamples

Fine proposes the theory of rigid embodiment for timeless parthood. As the sandwich example suggests, traditional mereology ignores the significance of the relations between parts of an object. In particular, it seems that the relation of betweenness was an important condition for the existence of the sandwich. So, under the theory of rigid embodiment, the whole is its parts a, b, c, \dots in the relation R . For example, the sandwich is s_1, s_2, h, \dots in the relation R such that h is in between s_1 and s_2 . It is called a rigid embodiment because the parts a, b, c, \dots do not change over time.

Five postulates govern the behavior of these rigid embodiments. Consider the rigid embodiment a, b, c, \dots in relation R . First, it exists at times at which R holds of a, b, c, \dots and so on. Second, it is located wherever a, b, c, \dots are located. Third, two rigid embodiments are identical if all their parts are identical and the relations are identical. Fourth, a, b, c, \dots are timeless parts of the rigid embodiment. Fifth, the relation R is a timeless part of the rigid embodiment.

This theory gives the existence condition we expect in normal cases. In response to the case with the monstrous object, it says that the sandwich cannot be the rigid embodiment s_1, s_2, \dots and m in the relation of betweenness R , because the location postulate fails to hold. Since the monstrous object is located where the sandwich is not, the rigid embodiment that contains the monstrous object is not the sandwich. Thus, this theory can also handle the cases previously thought to be problematic.

Then, Fine proposes the theory of variable embodiment for temporary parthood. Suppose there is a thing capable of gaining and losing parts, which is a variable embodiment, and designate it $/F/$. F , without the slashes, is the principle of variable embodiment. It is a function that picks out the manifestations of the variable

embodiment at different times. These manifestations are the rigid embodiments specified by the theory above.

There are six main postulates that govern the behavior of these variable embodiments. Consider the variable embodiment $/F/$, and let ft be the manifestation of the variable embodiment at t . First, $/F/$ exists at times at which it has a manifestation. Second, its location at t is the location of ft . Third, $/F/$ is identical to $/G/$ if and only if F is identical to G . Fourth, ft is a temporary part of $/F/$ at t . Fifth, temporary parts can be combined with timeless parts to form temporary parts. For example, if a is a temporary part of b , and b is a timeless part of c , then a is a temporary part of c . Similarly, if a is a timeless part of b , and b is a temporary part of c , then a is a temporary part of c . This gives “levels” to variable embodiments. For example, there are temporary parts of the engine, and the engine itself is a temporary part of the car, so the temporary parts of the engine are also temporary parts of the car. A hierarchal structure begins to appear from this theory. Sixth, if a is a temporary part of b at t , then there must be some mereological chain, as exemplified above, connecting a to b at t .

Thus, the carburetor is a temporary part of the car at t because its manifestation at t is a timeless part of the rigid embodiment of the car’s manifestation at t . The problem with the monstrous object, the combination of the carburetor and all things that exist before and after t , could be avoided because the variable embodiment principle of the car would not pick out those manifestations that contain the monstrous object. Thus, Fine’s theory of rigid and variable embodiment solves the problems posed by the two examples.

Next, I shall show that the four-dimensionalist who believes in traditional mereology with strong composition as identity can also provide solutions to the problems. It is important to note that the four-dimensionalist only has one notion of parthood, that of part *simpliciter*, or timeless parts.

So, in the sandwich case, what are the parts of the sandwich? The parts are not the slices of bread and the piece of ham. Rather, they are the temporal parts, or time-slices, of the slices of bread and ham, at times in which the sandwich exists. This preserves the notion of *making* a sandwich, because those temporal parts do not exist

until the sandwich has come to existence. When we casually say ‘the piece of ham is part of the sandwich’, what we really mean is that the piece of ham and the sandwich share temporal parts of the piece of ham at the times of the sandwich’s existence.

The monstrous object is then reformulated as the fusion of the temporal parts of the ham at times of the sandwich’s existence, call this interval-*t*, and all the things that exist before and after interval-*t*. Does the objection still have the same force? Not when the notion of temporal parts is properly understood. The sandwich only exists at interval-*t*, and the temporal parts of the monstrous object at those times are indeed parts of the sandwich, but this does not mean that the monstrous object is itself a part of the sandwich. Hence, the existence condition given is consistent with our intuition.

Turning to the example with the carburetor and the car, it is clear that the four-dimensionalist would not accept the proposition ‘the carburetor is currently a part of my car’ because he does not believe in a temporally-relativized notion of parthood. Fine thinks the natural way of paraphrasing that proposition in four-dimensionalist terms is to say that the temporal part carburetor-at-*t* is part *simpliciter* of the temporal part car-at-*t*. While a four-dimensionalist would accept that as the correct view, it is not equivalent to ‘the carburetor is currently a part of my car’.

Consider an analogy with roads. Suppose there are two highways, Interstate-95 and N.J. Turnpike, and they are the same road in the areas of the city of New Brunswick, New Jersey. In other words, I-95-at-New Brunswick is a part *simpliciter* of N.J. Turnpike-at-New Brunswick. Surely, we would not want to infer from that fact that at New Brunswick, I-95 is a part of N.J. Turnpike. Instead, the appropriate thing to say is that at New Brunswick, I-95 and N.J. Turnpike share physical parts, i.e. the road.

Likewise, the correct thing to say about the carburetor and the car is that, at *t*, the carburetor and the car share the temporal part of carburetor-at-*t*. Since all parthood relations hold timelessly, according to the four-dimensionalist, to say that the carburetor is currently a part of the car is just the same as saying the carburetor is a part of the car, which would be incorrect. Then, reconsider the monstrous object that is composed of carburetor-at-*t* and all things that exist before and after *t*. It is true that monstrous-

object-at-*t* is a part of car-at-*t*. It would also be correct to say that the monstrous object and the car share some temporal parts. What would be wrong, though, is to say that at *t*, this monstrous object is part of the car. Therefore, the existence condition given by this view again agrees with our intuition.

IV. Reasons to Prefer Mereology with Strong Composition as Identity

So now, there are two competing views, theory of embodiments and traditional mereology with temporal parts, that respond equally well to the objections raised by Fine's examples. However, the view entailed by strong composition as identity, unrestricted composition and four-dimensionalism has an advantage over Fine's theory because it requires no additional ontological commitments and is a simpler theory.

One advantage that Fine's view purports to possess is that the chaining of rigid embodiments and variable embodiments gives rise to a mereology that has hierarchical divisions. Furthermore, these divisions will correspond with natural divisions; for example, a car is divided into the engine, the body, and the wheels, and then the body is divided into the exterior metal frame and the interior furnishing, and so on. While Fine's view does generate these hierarchical divisions, the theory of embodiments nevertheless fails to adequately distinguish which divisions are more natural.

Consider this rather unnatural division of cars: the car is divided in half by its volume so that there is a front part and a back part; then, the front part is halved in the same way so that there is a left front part and a right front part; and so on. It is conceivable that there could be a variable embodiment principle *G* that picks out these parts accordingly, and build the corresponding hierarchical division. Furthermore, this variable embodiment would coincide with the "natural" division above, picked out by the variable embodiment principle *F*. Thus, when we refer to the car, it is actually unclear which of the coinciding variable embodiments, /*F*/ or /*G*/, we are referring to. More importantly, Fine's theory itself does not say which variable embodiment is the more natural division. Both /*F*/ and /*G*/ create comparable hierarchical structures, so if someone thinks /*F*/ is more natural, then it is because he

already thinks that the parts picked out by /F/ are the most natural parts. Although it is true that Fine's theory does provide divisions that correspond with our natural conception, it also allows for an infinite number of divisions that are considered unnatural. Therefore, the hierarchical division is no more enlightening than the mere mereological sums of parts.

Furthermore, the hierarchical division incurs additional ontological commitments. Fine concedes that there are far more entities in existence than normally supposed, and the number of them is even greater than the number of entities thought to exist under the unrestricted composition view.¹¹ Surely someone who has trouble accepting all the gerrymandered entities under traditional mereology would have greater trouble accepting all the coinciding entities under Fine's view. As argued above, accepting strong composition as identity does not incur any further ontological commitments, but accepting the theory of rigid and variable embodiments does. Hence, this is one reason to prefer the traditional mereology with temporal parts view over Fine's account. How powerful this reason is depends on one's view about ontological commitments.

Another aspect in which traditional mereology with temporal parts is simpler than Fine's view is the formulation of theory. Whereas Fine's theory needs many postulates to govern its behavior and two conceptions of parthood, traditional mereology with temporal parts uses fewer and more familiar concepts such as identity and only has the notion of part *simpliciter*. Again, the persuasiveness of this reason depends on one's view about the importance of having a simple theory.

While I have not given a knockdown argument of Fine's theory, I hope the combination of these reasons is enough for preferring the view entailed by strong composition as identity, unrestricted composition and four-dimensionalism. The thesis of strong composition as identity is crucial in rendering the view's greater simplicity and ontological innocence.*

Endnotes

* I thank helpful comments from professors Dean Zimmerman and especially Ted Sider on previous drafts.

1 Leonard and Goodman (1940).

2 Baxter (1988).

3 Another possible solution to Fine's concerns involves relativizing, or indexing, parthood to time. This also entails the rejection of composition as identity. However, the discussion of that is beyond the scope of this paper.

4 It is not clear to me what Fine means here. I do not think that Fine has four-dimensionalism in mind. Rather, the existence criteria include a condition of time.

5 Lewis (1991), 84-85.

6 Sider (2001), 160-161.

7 van Inwagen (1994), 211.

8 Provided that of the languages in question, neither is clearly more natural in eligibility or more beneficial in use, in David Lewis's terms. I think this is the case with English and Chinese.

9 The basic form of this objection is from (Yi 1999), 146-149; and (Sider MS), 8.

10 Sider (MS), 6.

11 Fine (1999), 73.

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Book Review

Reviewed by Enoch Lambert, Cornell University

A Companion to Heidegger, Blackwell Publishers

Editors: Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall; 2005, 540 pgs

The new Blackwell *Companion to Heidegger*, co-edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, is an excellent and comprehensive collection of 31 essays (26 new plus 5 classic and influential pieces) on Heidegger's life and philosophy written by leading scholars and interpreters of his work. The collection is ideal for scholars and novices alike. For novices, the volume gives general and clear overviews of the most important themes in Heidegger. For scholars, the essays advance Heidegger scholarship through original theses that are sure to provoke thought. A short review does not allow for extended commentary on each contribution to a work of this size, unfortunately, but the volume breaks down into a few topical sections that allow for useful commentary. Some essays in each section also merit particular attention. Furthermore, a definitive collection such as this also brings into relief what issues in Heidegger remain to be addressed. No companion to a philosopher as prolific and complicated as Heidegger can presume to be the completed word on him, and so I will try to mention what limitations and remaining issues this particular volume points to in the study and continuing relevance of Heidegger's philosophy.

The volume begins with a helpful introductory overview of Heidegger's life and works by the editors. Since the essay is itself a significant and substantial piece, rather than introducing and discussing every essay in the book, the editors parenthetically cite them as the pieces to look at in the context of the relevant subject matter being discussed. The two essays following the introduction (Van Buren's on recent scholarship on the pre-*Being and Time* Heidegger and Thomson's "Heidegger and National Socialism") might be considered a section on the relevance of Heidegger's development and life to his philosophy (the Ruin article on *Contributions to Philosophy*, in-

cluded in the section on Heidegger's later work, might also be considered to be somewhat a part of this section). Next, the volume turns to a section on Heidegger's engagement with the history of Western philosophy and thought. Included are articles on Heidegger's relation to Husserl, German Idealism, Kant, Nietzsche, and the Greeks (including the pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle). The next major section is on topics from *Being and Time*, and the last one is on topics from Heidegger's later philosophy (post-*Being and Time*). The volume also includes a few other important essays that do not fit into any neat category. One by Käufer on Heidegger and logic, debunks many popular misconceptions about Heidegger's views on logic and its relevancy to philosophy, owing largely to Carnap's (in)famous criticisms, and explicates and clarifies Heidegger's actual position. Another, by Rouse, is an important contribution to the study of Heidegger's philosophy of science in which he demonstrates the depth and complexity of Heidegger's early and later writings on science as well as how they relate to his changing philosophical views. Finally, there is a comprehensive analysis of Heidegger's relation to phenomenology by Boedeker that might be considered part of a sub-section made up of various pieces on philosophical methodology and other metaphysical issues scattered throughout the collection (this "sub-section" would also include Crowell's piece on Heidegger and Husserl, subtitled "The Matter and Method of Philosophy", Lafont's "Hermeneutics" and the reprint of Richard Rorty's "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism").

It is also important to point out that there are often two essays presenting different, yet mostly complementary, perspectives on a substantive issue in Heidegger's philosophy. In fact, there are two essays that have substantial contribution to each of the following issues in Heidegger: phenomenology (Crowell and Boedeker), philosophy of science (Rouse and Thomson), time and temporality (Blattner and Hoffman), truth (Cerbone and Wrathall), Ereignis (Polt and Spinoza), art (Guignon and Dreyfus), and the history of being (Guignon and Okrent). Thus, whether it be major, broad sections in Heidegger, smaller sub-sections of the kind mentioned above, or even particular important issues, this volume certainly has it covered (with a few caveats I discuss at the end).

As mentioned above, the editors' introduction is a significant essay in itself

and provides an excellent overview to the beginning student of Heidegger's work. Perhaps most important is the editors' clear and concise introduction of Heidegger's early classification of kinds of beings: the available, the occurrent, and the existing ("Dasein"), as well as their explanation of Heidegger's argument that the ontological significance of each class of beings cannot be investigated through "ontical" or scientific research but only through what Heidegger calls "fundamental ontology", the proper method of which, he thinks, is hermeneutic phenomenology. Also important is their contrasting of the philosophical tradition's insistence on characterizing human understanding as essentially a cognitive understanding with Heidegger's radical arguments in *Being and Time* that human understanding is primarily an existential understanding. While the tradition (up to and including today) sees "propositional-intentional states" as constitutive of human being, the editors deftly explain how Heidegger argues that a more primordial, yet still distinctively human, way of being-in-the-world is in fact constitutive of the former kind of human phenomena. Besides these themes from Division I of *Being and Time*, the editors also introduce several themes from Division II (authenticity, being-toward-death, etc.).

The editors also introduce and give important yet hitherto hard to find summaries of important elements in Heidegger's later thought (e.g., unconcealment, art, poetry, Ereignis, technology, language, dwelling, the fourfold, etc.) that will be very helpful to students seeking to gain a foothold in this extremely difficult part of Heidegger's philosophy. However, there is one important inconsistency between what the editors say and what is found in a later essay that will be important to address in further research. The editors say that Heidegger's later thoughts on language seek to explicate it in terms of world-disclosure and they properly cite the classic (though slightly revised for this collection) Charles Taylor paper, "Heidegger, language, and ecology". So far, so good. But the editors go on to talk about how the later Heidegger supposedly tries to demonstrate an "originary language" prior to "human communicative practices" which somehow highlights the key features of the world and to which human speech only responds. While Taylor does speak of the need to recapture the receptive and responsive function of human language in order to overcome the "enframing" approaches to language detested by Heidegger, he also unequivocally sees

Heidegger's later views on human speech as constitutive of certain essential human phenomena (such as certain emotions, relations, and values) and not merely responsive to them. This seems to be in contradiction or at least in tension with the view expressed by the editors (though they do not acknowledge it). Unfortunately, *neither* essay cites much textual support in favor of its view (Taylor does a little, the editors none at all). Considering that Heidegger's later essays on language contain many controversial sayings (such as that words bring certain things [even physical things] to being for the first time, as well as that at the essence of language there is stillness and silence), it will be important for future research to sort this issue out by thoroughly engaging Heidegger's texts and trying to figure out both what might be significant in human speech as well as what a non-human-communicative "originary language" is and how it works. With that, let me now turn to discussion of each general section in the book.

Heidegger's Development and Life

In his essay on the pre-*Being and Time* Heidegger, Van Buren argues that an important early *Kehre* ("turn" that is supposed to have taken place in Heidegger's thinking after *Being and Time*) took place around 1917-18, when Heidegger turned to phenomenology. He says that recent research on this early part of Heidegger's philosophical life and development has transformed scholarly understanding of him. In the essay he highlights how daring, radical, and anti-traditional philosophy Heidegger was prior to *Being and Time*. He also discusses the extent and importance of Heidegger's turn to phenomenology of religion and religious life influenced by his reading of the Apostle Paul, Medieval theologians, and Martin Luther.

The other main essay of this section engages the issue of Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis. This issue has been worked over by scores of thinkers and scholars, but Thomson manages to add something to the debates by refusing to get embroiled in debates about the extent of Heidegger's involvement, whether he made adequate expiation for his involvement, etc. Instead, Thomson takes an interesting position by arguing that Heidegger's philosophy and politics were indeed intimately linked in certain ways (particularly through his vision for the reformation of the uni-

versity) but that, even so, there are good reasons why Heidegger's philosophy cannot be dismissed.

History of Philosophy

This section should be particularly helpful to those interested in Heidegger's profound engagement and struggle with the history of Western philosophy since Heidegger has many lecture courses and lesser known writings (many of which have yet to be translated into English) that deal with these issues and which are hard to wade through. Han-Pile's "Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant" is particularly interesting in that it engages both important Kantian literature and important recent interpretations of Heidegger, such as Blattner's, which has been influential in re-emphasizing the transcendental aspects of Heidegger's early philosophy. Han-Pile thoroughly engages the question of whether Heidegger is a transcendental philosopher through interpreting the literature mentioned above. While there are important and helpful essays on Nietzsche and the Greeks, conspicuously absent is any article on Holderlin. This is surprising considering the editors' own acknowledgment of the importance of Holderlin and poetry to Heidegger's thought. Considering the quality of essays written specifically for this collection as well as the paucity of similar essays on Holderlin and Heidegger, it is a shame one was not commissioned for this volume.

Being and Time

This section of the volume has a good balance of essays on both divisions of *Being and Time*. Included is a reprint of "Heidegger's Categories in *Being and Time*" by Robert Brandom, which is a very helpful and insightful explanation of the classes of beings Heidegger introduces in Division I, their relation to one another, and how Dasein discovers each one. There is also an important article by Schatzski on sociality in early Heidegger which responds to and rebuts criticisms made by various authors against these views (some trying to argue that Heidegger was solipsistic, despite his claims that Dasein is essentially "Being-with" other Dasein). There are also good articles sorting

out the difficult and often confusing topics of the second division: authenticity (Carman), death and mortality (Mulhall), and time and temporality (Blattner and Hoffman). Blattner's article clearly and concisely elucidates the structure of Dasein's originary temporality, explains how it relates to Dasein's care structure and the other modes of time with their corresponding modes of being, and tells how Heidegger thinks originary temporality constitutes the horizon for any understanding of being. Hoffman complements Blattner's discussion of the non-successive unity of originary temporality by explaining how Heidegger thinks Dasein's time is nevertheless "stretched out" by its inherently finite nature.

The Later Philosophy

Another asset of the book is that most of the essays on topics in Heidegger's later philosophy are thoroughly grounded in his earlier work. Whatever major changes Heidegger made in his later work, the importance of everyday practices and practical comportment, the phenomenon of world disclosure, the understanding of being, and the temporal and finite character of Dasein's existence all remain part of the essential interpretive framework Heidegger brings to the problems of his later philosophy. The essays by Wrathall, Polt, Guignon, Dreyfus, Borgmann, and Spinoza all do a nice job of showing how certain elements of their respective topics can best be seen in the light of early Heidegger's insights as well as how some of those insights were further developed in the later Heidegger. This will be helpful to students more familiar with the Heidegger of *Being and Time* who are trying to get a handle on the later philosophy. Of course, each of these essays also does a fine job of explicating the genuinely original and ground breaking work of Heidegger's later philosophy. The point is that they also show how those new insights are most properly appreciated in the light of Heidegger's earlier work.

The section begins with Wrathall's article on "Unconcealment", the name Heidegger gives to what he calls the essence of truth. In this article, Wrathall continues his defense, made elsewhere, of the thesis that Heidegger defended a kind of correspondence theory of truth and that his thoughts on "disclosure", "uncovering",

“unconcealment”, etc., were efforts to answer the question of how such correspondence was possible—i.e., the question of the essence of truth. Wrathall says that Heidegger answered this question with “unconcealment” and then used several essays and lecture courses for more than a decade after *Being and Time* to investigate this essential phenomenon. He argues, then, that understanding “unconcealment” is key to understanding Heidegger’s later philosophy. Wrathall also makes some interesting comparisons of Heidegger’s views on how things’ essences get disclosed for us with Kripke’s ideas on what constitutes a thing’s essence.

The section on the later work also includes two essays on Heidegger’s difficult notion of Ereignis. Whereas Polt provides a comprehensive overview of the different senses Heidegger gives to his use of Ereignis (including pre-*Being and Time* use), Spinosa focuses on a single interpretation of Ereignis—the tendency in the practices of a culture to resonate and gather, bringing things out into their ownmost and letting a determinate understanding of being persist, if only for a finite amount of time—and contrasts it with Derrida’s notion of iterability, the tendency of practices to disperse and shift. Besides that, there is an excellent account of Heidegger on the history of being by Guignon; an essay by Borgmann on technology that traces the development of Heidegger’s thinking on the topic and provides an interpretive framework for reading his main essay on it; and a piece by Edwards helpfully elucidating Heidegger’s notions of essential dwelling, the fourfold, and the focusing power of simple things like wine jugs.

Finally, for this section, Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger’s ontology of art is illuminating. He translates Heidegger’s terminology into simple and profound concepts, discussing how works of art can manifest, articulate, or reconfigure the style of the everyday practices in a culture, letting the people of a culture get in tune with things and each other in the light of how works of art focus their style for them. He calls works of art “cultural paradigms”, comparing Heidegger’s notion with Kuhn’s as well as with ideas found in Clifford Geertz and Charles Taylor. He ends by asking and discussing whether a work of art could reconfigure the technological style of our contemporary practices, delivering us from their current “enframing” effects that Heidegger so feared.

Limitations and Future Work

Finally, I would like to discuss the limitations of this volume and how it helps indicate some of the next important steps to be taken in the study of Heidegger's philosophy. Thus far I have already mentioned topics like Holderlin and Heidegger's later views on language. There are also issues like Heidegger's interest in and relation to Asian philosophies, as well as his many different approaches to how to characterize the distinctiveness and essence of human being. However, there is one major topic I would like to briefly discuss.

While the editors begin the book mentioning Heidegger's influence on many fields beyond philosophy, his continuing relevance either to philosophy or to fields outside the discipline is not taken up as an explicit theme by the new work in the collection very much at all (the essays by Taylor, Rorty, Okrent, and Spinoza, each more than a decade old, have varying levels of discussion of Heidegger's relevance to ongoing issues). This is somewhat surprising given earlier work by Dreyfus, Wrathall, and others stressing the continuing importance of Heidegger's work (though, to be fair, it may be implicit in Wrathall's comparisons to Kripke; and Dreyfus does discuss the question of whether a work of art could reconfigure the style of our practices today). Previously, Dreyfus and those influenced by him have focused on comparing Heidegger to leading philosophers in the analytic tradition who may be seen as a continuing part of the linguistic turn. However, it is becoming more and more evident that current analytic trends are taking either a naturalistic turn, or a turn back to metaphysics (inspired, of course, by people like Kripke, Lewis, van Inwagen, etc.). In either case, the idea that philosophers can only assert what an analysis of language affords is being left behind. Heidegger's own ideas about "overcoming metaphysics" were certainly influenced by the criticisms of people like Carnap who were instrumental in the linguistic turn. However, it is time now to explore what relation Heidegger's work might have to "naturalized" philosophy that is concerned with what is going on in the sciences¹ as well as to philosophy that is re-exploring classic and substantive metaphysical questions.

One example of how the latter might take place is in the topic of modality. In the introduction, the editors stress the importance of Dasein's projection onto possibilities for its understanding. They contrast what Heidegger means by "possibility" with what is typically meant by that term in philosophy (e.g., logical possibility, contingent empirical states or events, etc.). Unfortunately, there is little else in the volume about Heidegger's distinctive sense of what possibilities are (Blattner has a particularly helpful discussion in the context of temporality, but does not take it up as a theme in itself). Given the resurgence of interest in modality in the analytic world (thanks to people like Kripke and David Lewis), a topic of great interest would be Heidegger's distinctive use of modality (particularly possibility) and a comparison with contemporary discussions of modality (e.g., is Lewis' modal realism, which is supposed to explain our use of modality, helpful at all in explaining the kind of possibility Heidegger talks about?).

To briefly conclude, then, this collection of essays is highly successful not only in both its comprehensive and original treatment of the major themes in Heidegger, but also in the way it helps point toward what remains to be done in order to continue maintaining a sense for Heidegger's relevancy to contemporary problems and interests.²

Endnotes

¹ In fact, as this was going to press, I learned of a brand new book by Michael Wheeler, *Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step*, The MIT Press, 2005, arguing that Heidegger's account of human being is confirmed by the most recent developments in cognitive science. Furthermore, Wheeler argues that whereas Dreyfus has previously used Heidegger to make negative predictions about the success of cognitive science and AI, the time has now come for a research program in cognitive science that is positively informed by a Heideggerian approach.

² I would like to thank Mark Wrathall for providing me with a copy of the final manuscript before it was out in print.

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